The National Security Agency\u27s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate by Cole, David & Lederman, Martin S.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2006 
The National Security Agency's Domestic Spying Program: 
Framing the Debate 
David Cole 
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu 
Martin S. Lederman 
Georgetown University Law Center, msl46@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1672 
 
81 Ind. L.J. 1355-1425 (2006) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
The National Security Agency's Domestic Spying Program:
Framing the Debate
DAVID COLE* AND MARTIN S. LEDERMAN**
On Friday, December 16, 2005, the New York Times reported that President George
W. Bush had secretly authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct
warrantless surveillance of Americans' telephone and e-mail communications as part of
an effort to obtain intelligence about future terrorist activity.' The Times report was
based on leaks of classified information, presumably by NSA officials concerned about
the legality of the program. The Times reported that at the President's request it had
delayed publication of the story for more than a year.
Once its existence was disclosed, the NSA program caused a firestorm of
controversy, because the program appeared to violate specific statutory limits on
electronic surveillance contained in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).2
FISA is a landmark statute enacted with the approval of the President in 1978 and
amended numerous times since. The President's authorization of the NSA program
appeared to contravene both FISA's criminal prohibition on statutorily unauthorized
electronic surveillance, and another statutory provision specifying that FISA's
procedures are to be the "exclusive means" by which such surveillance can be lawfully
performed for foreign intelligence purposes.3 Senator Arlen Specter, chair of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, immediately questioned the legality of the
program, and announced that his committee would hold hearings on the issue early in
the new year.4 The Bush Administration responded with an aggressive public relations
campaign, in which the Vice President, the Attorney General, General Michael Hayden
(the principal deputy director for national intelligence), and the President himself
defended the program in multiple fora.
In the pages that follow, the Indiana Law Journal reprints four documents that,
taken together, set forth the basic arguments concerning the lawfulness of the secret
NSA surveillance program. The debate outlined by the four documents raises important
issues about statutory interpretation in the face of claims of constitutional conflict,
executive power during times of war, fundamental privacy rights of Americans, and
ultimately, the rule of law in the war on terror.
It is important to clarify, as well, what the debate is not about-namely, whether the
President should be able to intercept phone calls made between al Qaeda members
abroad and persons within the United States. There is broad consensus that federal
authorities should monitor calls involving al Qaeda. Indeed, FISA does not prohibit
such surveillance. For one thing, the statute has no application at all to surveillance
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
** Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2005, at 1.
2. 50 U.S.C. 1801, et. seq., and provisions in Title 18, United States Code.
3. 50 U.S.C. 1809; 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f).
4. Dan Eggen & Charles Lane, On Hill, Anger and Calls for Hearings Greet News of
Stateside Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2005, at Al.
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targeted at persons abroad and collected overseas. 5 And it authorizes domestic
surveillance targeted at U.S. persons in the United States, as long as a court finds
probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign
power and that the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed
are being used by such an agent of a foreign power.6 Moreover, FISA permits
surveillance to be initiated before court approval so long as approval is sought within
seventy-two hours, 7 and it also permits surveillance without court approval during the
first fifteen days of a war, during which time Congress can consider proposals for
wartime statutory amendments.
8
Notwithstanding these broad statutory authorizations, the President has authorized
the NSA both to circumvent FISA's court-approval process with respect to electronic
surveillance that would be authorized by FISA,9 and, almost certainly, to engage in
forms of surveillance that FISA prohibits.
10
5. FISA is inapplicable to surveillance of communications collected outside the United
States and not targeted at U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens (collectively referred to as
"U.S. persons") within the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 1801(f(l)-(2) (defining "electronic
surveillance"). Thus, FISA does not impose any limits on wiretapping of calls between foreign
nationals outside the United States-whether or not they are associated with al Qaeda-and
persons within the United States, as long as the calls are not intercepted domestically, and the
tap is not "targeted" at a U.S. person within the country. (If international surveillance is targeted
at U.S. persons abroad, the Fourth Amendment might impose some limits. See also Exec. Order
No. 12,333 § 2.5, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (delegating to the Attorney General the
power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United
States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for
law enforcement purposes, "provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the
Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the
technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"). But FISA as such
does not regulate such surveillance.)
6. Where FISA applies-i.e., where the calls are intercepted domestically, or where the
surveillance targets a U.S. person in the United States-the statute merely requires that certain
criteria for such surveillance be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a neutral judge on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The FISA Court is required to issue an ex parte order
approving such surveillance if the statutory criteria are satisfied-the most significant of which
are that there is probable cause to believe (i) that the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and (ii) that each of the facilities or places at
which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(3). (Under the statute, "agents of a
foreign power" includes persons who knowingly engage in, or aid and abet, or conspire to
commit, sabotage or international terrorism (or activities in preparation for such terrorism), for
or on behalf of a foreign power (including al Qaeda), as well as other non-U.S. persons who act
in the United States as officers or employees of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. 1801(b).)
7. 50 U.S.C. 1805(f).
8. 50 U.S.C. 1811.
9. The NSA program apparently includes surveillance that is acquired within the United
States and/or targeted at U.S. persons, because the Bush administration has conceded that its
wiretaps include "electronic surveillance" covered by FISA. See Press Briefing by Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National
Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/12/20051219-l.html) (stating that NSA is engaged in "electronic surveillance" and that
1356 [Vol. 81:1355
NSA DOMESTIC SPYING PROGRAM
In December 2005, the Administration set forth its legal defense of the NSA
program in a letter from the Department of Justice (DOJ) addressed to the leaders of
the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. That letter, reproduced here, outlined a
three-part defense of the program: Most prominently, DOJ argued that Congress had
implicitly authorized the NSA's warrantless surveillance program when it authorized
the use of military force against al Qaeda in September 2001. More obliquely, the DOJ
suggested that to interpret the 2001 force authorization statute as not authorizing the
NSA program would raise a serious constitutional question, because in that case
FISA's prohibition of the surveillance would interfere with the President's authority as
commander in chief to execute the war against al Qaeda in the manner he thought most
effective. Finally, the letter argued that the wiretapping program does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
In response to the Administration's letter, we worked with a group of constitutional
scholars and former government officials to draft a letter in response, also reprinted
here. In our letter, dated January 9, 2006, we argued: (1) that the authorization to use
military force against al Qaeda cannot be read to authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance in the face of clear and specific statutory prohibitions on that conduct-
including the provision specifying that FISA shall be the "exclusive means" of
performing electronic surveillance and another provision of FISA specifically
addressing the President's surveillance authority in wartime; (2) that the canon of
constitutional avoidance-that ambiguous statutes should be construed to avoid serious
constitutional questions-is inapposite here, where Congress had extensively grappled
with the constitutional question in the legislative process and had crafted the statute
specifically in order to preclude the President from invoking a constitutional authority
to engage in electronic surveillance outside the "exclusive means" that FISA
prescribes; (3) that interpreting FISA to prohibit such wiretapping does not
unconstitutionally interfere with the President's role as commander in chief; and (4)
FISA "requires a court order before engaging in this kind of surveillance"); White Paper at 17
n.5, infra at 1390 (assuming arguendo that the NSA program involves "electronic surveillance"
as defined in FISA).
10. As of the time of this writing it appears that the NSA program collects surveillance that
would not be approved under FISA if the administration were to seek authorization by a FISA
Court under the statute. According to the Administration, under the program the NSA must only
find "reasonable grounds to believe" that at least one party to the communication is a member or
agent of al Qaeda or an "affiliated terrorist organization"--a standard that could permit wiretaps
of the phones of U.S. persons in the United States who are not themselves al Qaeda agents.
Thus, it appears that NSA does not require in every case that there be probable cause to believe
that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Under FISA as currently written, the FISA Court could not approve such surveillance, and the
leading judicial precedent indicates that without judicial approval such surveillance of U.S.
persons would likely violate the Fourth Amendment. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594,
614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e hold today... that a warrant must be
obtained before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor
acting in collaboration with a foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed under
presidential directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection of the national
security."); id. at 689 (Wilkey, J., concurring in pertinent part) (agreeing with plurality that if an
exemption from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement exists, "it exists only for a
narrow category of wiretaps on foreign agents or collaborators with a foreign power").
2006] 1357
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that based on the publicly available information, the NSA wiretapping program appears
to raise serious constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment.
The Bush Administration subsequently submitted a much more extensive "White
Paper" to Congress further developing its legal position, also reprinted here. In that
White Paper, the Administration again argued that the 2001 military-force
authorization resolution provided statutory authority to engage in electronic
surveillance outside the "exclusive means" prescribed by FISA. In addition, the DOJ
White Paper argued more explicitly, and at much greater length, that "serious
constitutional questions" are raised whenever Congress enacts statutes that "interfere
... at all" with what the Administration calls "a core exercise of Commander in Chief
control over the Armed Forces during armed conflict"-in particular, "the
Commander-in-Chief s control of the means and methods of engaging the enemy." On
that theory, serious constitutional doubt would arise whenever Congress regulates not
only the wiretapping of domestic communications performed as part of the war effort,
but also the detention of those suspected of being enemy combatants (including U.S.
citizens), the interrogation of those who might provide information relevant to the war
(including by torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment), or
when a statute determines the scope of a war, such as by prescribing or regulating the
theatre of war, the use of certain weapons (e.g., land mines), and the identity of the
enemy.
In February, our same group of scholars and former government officials drafted a
reply to the Bush Administration's White Paper, the final document reprinted here.
This letter further addresses the DOJ's statutory arguments." We also argue in greater
detail that the Administration's constitutional theory of the Commander in Chief
Clause is fundamentally flawed. Each time the Supreme Court has addressed the issue
directly-most recently in cases involving the detention of alleged enemy combatants
in the conflict against al Qaeda-the Court has rejected the notion that the commander
in chief may disregard statutory constraints enacted pursuant to Congress's enumerated
powers. 12
11. The statutory questions are addressed in even greater detail in an extensive critique
submitted to Congress in March 2006 by David Kris, who was the Associate Deputy Attorney
General in charge of national security issues from 2000 to 2003. See Testimony of David S. Kris
before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate 2-8 & nn. 19-69 (Mar. 28, 2006),
available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.testimony.pdf. Although we do not necessarily agree
with all of the particulars of Kris's testimony (including portions of his Article H analysis), his
statutory discussion (as well as his suggestions for how FISA might be amended) is
indispensable. He concludes that "I do not believe the statutory law will bear the government's
weight. It is very hard to read the AUMF as authorizing 'electronic surveillance' in light of the
nearly simultaneous enactment of the Patriot Act. It is essentially impossible to read it as
repealing FISA's exclusivity provision. And the AUMF suffers further in light of FISA's
express wartime provisions. Even with the benefit of constitutional avoidance doctrine, I do not
think that Congress can be said to have authorized the NSA surveillance." Id. at 8.
Unfortunately, the Department of Justice did not have the benefit of Kris's analysis while he
worked in the Department, because Kris was not "read into" the NSA program, despite the fact
that he was one of the highest-ranking Department officials on matters relating to FISA and
national security. Id. at 1.
12. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see
also, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Little v. Barreme, 6
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The question that these documents raise is not whether suspected al Qaeda
members' phone calls should be monitored, but whether wiretapping of Americans in
pursuit of that objective should be done pursuant to law, or pursuant to secret orders
issued by the President in contravention of law. Our view is that if the President finds
federal law inadequate in some measure, the proper course is to ask Congress to
change it. What the President cannot do in our democracy is order that the law be
violated in secret.
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
13592006]
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December 22, 2005 Letter from Department of Justice to the
Leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
WILuIAM E. MOSCHELLA*
Dear Chairmen Roberts and Hoekstra, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and Ranking
Member Harman:
As you know, in response to unauthorized disclosures in the media, the President
has described certain activities of the National Security Agency ("NSA") that he has
authorized since shortly after September 11, 2001. As described by the President, the
NSA intercepts certain international communications into and out of the United States
of people linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The purpose of
these intercepts is to establish an early warning system to detect and prevent another
catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States. The President has made clear that he
will use his constitutional and statutory authorities to protect the American people from
further terrorist attacks, and the NSA activities the President described are part of that
effort. Leaders of the Congress were briefed on these activities more than a dozen
times.
The purpose of this letter is to provide an additional brief summary of the legal
authority supporting the NSA activities described by the President.
As an initial matter, I emphasize a few points. The President stated that these
activities are "crucial to our national security." The President further explained that
"the unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our
citizens at risk. Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and
endangers our country." These critical national security activities remain classified. All
United States laws and policies governing the protection and nondisclosure of national
security information including the information relating to the activities described by the
President, remain in full force and effect. The unauthorized disclosure of classified
information violates federal criminal law. The Government may provide further
classified briefings to the Congress on these activities in an appropriate manner. Any
such briefings will be conducted in a manner that will not endanger national security.
Under Article II of the Constitution, including in his capacity as Commander in
Chief, the President has the responsibility to protect the Nation from further attacks,
and the Constitution gives him all necessary authority to fulfill that duty. See, e.g.,
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (stressing that if the Nation is invaded,
"the President is not only authorized but hound to resist by force.., without waiting
for any special legislative authority"); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,27 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe Prize Cases... stand for the proposition that
the President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even
without specific congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of
force selected."); id. at 40 (Tatel, J., concurring). The Congress recognized this
* William E. Moschella is the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Affairs. -eds.
1360 [Vol. 81:1355
NSA DOMESTIC SPYING PROGRAM
constitutional authority in the preamble to the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force ("AUMF") of September 18, 2001, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) ("[Tlhe President has
authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States."), and in the War Powers Resolution, see 50
U.S.C. § 1541 (c) ("The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities[] ... [extend to] a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces.").
This constitutional authority includes the authority to order warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance within the United States, as all federal appellate courts,
including at least four circuits, to have addressed the issue have concluded. See, e.g., In
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,742 (FISA Ct. of Review 2002) ("[A]ll the other courts
to have decided the issue [have] held that the President did have inherent authority to
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information.... We take
for granted that the President does have that authority.... .") The Supreme Court has
said that warrants are generally required in the context of purely domestic threats, but it
expressly distinguished foreign threats. See United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). As Justice Byron White recognized almost 40 years
ago, Presidents have long exercised the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance
for national security purposes, and a warrant is unnecessary "if the President of the
United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1967) (White, J., concurring).
The President's constitutional authority to direct the NSA to conduct the activities
he described is supplemented by statutory authority under the AUMF. The AUMF
authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.... in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States." § 2(a). The AUMF clearly
contemplates action within the United States, see also id. pmbl. (the attacks of
September 11 "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise
its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and
abroad"). The AUMF cannot be read as limited to authorizing the use of force against
Afghanistan, as some have argued. Indeed, those who directly "committed" the attacks
of September 11 resided in the United States for months before those attacks. The
reality of the September 11 plot demonstrates that the authorization of force covers
activities both on foreign soil and in America.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court addressed the scope
of the AUMF. At least five Justices concluded that the AUMF authorized the President
to detain a U.S. citizen in the United States because "detention to prevent a
combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war" and is
therefore included in the "necessary and appropriate force" authorized by the
Congress. Id. at 518-19 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). These five Justices concluded that the AUMF "clearly and unmistakably
authorize[s]" the "fundamental incident[s] of waging war." Id. at 518-19 (plurality
opinion); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Communications intelligence targeted at the enemy is a fundamental incident of the
use of military force. Indeed, throughout history, signals intelligence has formed a
critical part of waging war. In the Civil War, each side tapped the telegraph lines of the
2006]
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other. In the World Wars, the United States intercepted telegrams into and out of the
country. The AUMF cannot be read to exclude this long-recognized and essential
authority to conduct communications intelligence targeted at the enemy. We cannot
fight a war blind. Because communications intelligence activities constitute, to use the
language of Hamdi, a fundamental incident of waging war, the AUMF clearly and
unmistakably authorizes such activities directed against the communications of our
enemy. Accordingly, the President's "authority is at its maximum." Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (noting
the absence of a statute "from which [the asserted authority] c[ould] be fairly
implied").
The President's authorization of targeted electronic surveillance by the NSA is also
consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). Section 2511(2)(f)
of title 18 provides, as relevant here, that the procedures of FISA and two chapters of
title 18 "shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... may be
conducted." Section 109 of FISA, in turn, makes it unlawful to conduct electronic
surveillance, "except as authorized by statute." 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1). Importantly,
section 109's exception for electronic surveillance "authorized by statute" is broad,
especially considered in the context of surrounding provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 25 11(1)
("Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who--(a)
intentionally intercepts ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication[]... shall be
punished. . . .") (emphasis added); id. § 2511(2)(e) (providing a defense to liability to
individuals "conduct[ing] electronic surveillance, ... as authorized by that Act
[FISA]") (emphasis added).
By expressly and broadly excepting from its prohibition electronic surveillance
undertaken "as authorized by statute," section 109 of FISA permits an exception to the
"procedures" of FISA referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) where authorized by
another statute, even if the other authorizing statute does not specifically amend section
2511(2)(f). The AUMF satisfies section 109's requirement for statutory authorization
of electronic surveillance, just as a majority of the Court in Hamdi concluded that it
satisfies the requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) that no U.S. citizen be detained by the
United States "except pursuant to an Act of Congress." See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519
(explaining that "it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of
detention"); see id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Some might suggest that FISA could be read to require that a subsequent statutory
authorization must come in the form of an amendment to FISA itself. But under
established principles of statutory construction, the AUMF and FISA must be
construed in harmony to avoid any potential conflict between FISA and the President's
Article I1 authority as Commander in Chief. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678,689 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001). Accordingly, any ambiguity
as to whether the AUMF is a statute that satisfies the requirements of FISA and allows
electronic surveillance in the conflict with al Qaeda without complying with FISA
procedures must be resolved in favor of an interpretation that is consistent with the
President's long-recognized authority.
The NSA activities described by the President are also consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and the protection of civil liberties. The Fourth Amendment's "central
requirement is one of reasonableness." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). For searches conducted in the course of ordinary
criminal law enforcement, reasonableness generally requires securing a warrant. See
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Bd. of Educ., v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). Outside the ordinary criminal law
enforcement context, however, the Supreme Court has, at times, dispensed with the
warrant, instead adjudging the reasonableness of a search under the totality of the
circumstances. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). In particular,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that "special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement," can justify departure from the usual warrant requirement.
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); see also City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,41-42 (2000) (striking down checkpoint where
"primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing").
Foreign intelligence collection, especially in the midst of an armed conflict in which
the adversary has already launched catastrophic attacks within the United States, fits
squarely within the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement. Foreign
intelligence collection undertaken to prevent further devastating attacks on our Nation
serves the highest government purpose through means other than traditional law
enforcement. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 745; United States v. Duggan, 743
F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment implications of
foreign intelligence surveillance are far different from ordinary wiretapping, because
they are not principally used for criminal prosecution).
Intercepting communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to
al Qaeda in order to detect and prevent a catastrophic attack is clearly reasonable.
Reasonableness is generally determined by "balancing the nature of the intrusion on the
individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Earls,
536 U.S. at 829. There is undeniably an important and legitimate privacy interest at
stake with respect to the activities described by the President. That must be balanced,
however, against the Government's compelling interest in the security of the Nation,
see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) ("It is obvious and unarguable that
no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.") (citation
and quotation marks omitted). The fact that the NSA activities are reviewed and
reauthorized approximately every 45 days to ensure that they continue to be necessary
and appropriate further demonstrates the reasonableness of these activities.
As explained above, the President determined that it was necessary following
September 11 to create an early warning detection system. FISA could not have
provided the speed and agility required for the early warning detection system. In
addition, any legislative change, other than the AUMF, that the President might have
sought specifically to create such an early warning system would have been public and
would have tipped off our enemies concerning our intelligence limitations and
capabilities. Nevertheless, I want to stress that the United States makes full use of
FISA to address the terrorist threat, and FISA has proven to be a very important tool,
especially in longer-term investigations. In addition, the United States is constantly
assessing all available legal options, taking full advantage of any developments in the
law.
We hope this information is helpful.
Sincerely,
William E. Moschella
Assistant Attorney General
13632006]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
January 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in
Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22, 2005
Dear Members of Congress:
We are scholars of constitutional law and former government officials. We write in
our individual capacities as citizens concerned by the Bush Administration's National
Security Agency domestic spying program, as reported in the New York Times, and in
particular to respond to the Justice Department's December 22, 2005 letter to the
majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees setting
forth the administration's defense of the program.' Although the program's secrecy
prevents us from being privy to all of its details, the Justice Department's defense of
what it concedes was secret and warrantless electronic surveillance of persons within
the United States fails to identify any plausible legal authority for such surveillance.
Accordingly the program appears on its face to violate existing law.
The basic legal question here is not new. In 1978, after an extensive investigation of
the privacy violations associated with foreign intelligence surveillance programs,
Congress and the President enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Pub. L. 95-511,92 Stat. 1783. FISA comprehensively regulates electronic surveillance
within the United States, striking a careful balance between protecting civil liberties
and preserving the "vitally important government purpose" of obtaining valuable
intelligence in order to safeguard national security. S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 9
(1977).
With minor exceptions, FISA authorizes electronic surveillance only upon certain
specified showings, and only if approved by a court. The statute specifically allows for
warrantless wartime domestic electronic surveillance-but only for the first fifteen
days of a war. 50 U.S.C. § 1811. It makes criminal any electronic surveillance not
authorized by statute, id. § 1809; and it expressly establishes FISA and specified
provisions of the federal criminal code (which govern wiretaps for criminal
investigation) as the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... may be
conducted," 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(f) (emphasis added).2
The Department of Justice concedes that the NSA program was not authorized by
any of the above provisions. It maintains, however, that the program did not violate
existing law because Congress implicitly authorized the NSA program when it enacted
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al Qaeda, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). But the AUMF cannot reasonably be construed to
implicitly authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States during
1. The Justice Department letter can be found at www.nationalreview.comlpdf/
12%2022%2005%20NSA%201etter.pdf.
2. More detail about the operation of FISA can be found in Congressional Research
Service, "Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather
Foreign Intelligence Information" (Jan. 5, 2006). This letter was drafted prior to release of the
CRS Report, which corroborates the conclusions drawn here.
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wartime, where Congress has expressly and specifically addressed that precise question
in FISA and limited any such warrantless surveillance to the first fifteen days of war.
The DOJ also invokes the President's inherent constitutional authority as
Commander in Chief to collect "signals intelligence" targeted at the enemy, and
maintains that construing FISA to prohibit the President's actions would raise
constitutional questions. But even conceding that the President in his role as
Commander in Chief may generally collect signals intelligence on the enemy abroad,
Congress indisputably has authority to regulate electronic surveillance within the
United States, as it has done in FISA. Where Congress has so regulated, the President
can act in contravention of statute only if his authority is exclusive, and not subject to
the check of statutory regulation. The DOJ letter pointedly does not make that
extraordinary claim.
Moreover, to construe the AUMF as the DOJ suggests would itself raise serious
constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has never
upheld warrantless wiretapping within the United States. Accordingly, the principle
that statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions provides an
additional reason for concluding that the AUMF does not authorize the President's
actions here.
I. CONGRESS DID NOT IMPLICITLY AUTHORIZE THE NSA DOMESTIC SPYING
PROGRAM IN THE AUMF, AND IN FACT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED IT IN FISA
The DOJ concedes (Letter at 4) that the NSA program involves "electronic
surveillance," which is defined in FISA to mean the interception of the contents of
telephone, wire, or email communications that occur, at least in part, in the United
States. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f)(1)-(2), 1801(n). NSA engages in such surveillance
without judicial approval, and apparently without the substantive showings that FISA
requires-e.g., that the subject is an "agent of a foreign power." Id. § 1805(a). The
DOJ does not argue that FISA itself authorizes such electronic surveillance; and, as the
DOJ letter acknowledges, 18 U.S.C. § 1809 makes criminal any electronic surveillance
not authorized by statute.
The DOJ nevertheless contends that the surveillance is authorized by the AUMF,
signed on September 18, 2001, which empowers the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force against" al Qaeda. According to the DOJ, collecting "signals
intelligence" on the enemy, even if it involves tapping U.S. phones without court
approval or probable cause, is a "fundamental incident of war" authorized by the
AUMF. This argument fails for four reasons.
First, and most importantly, the DOJ's argument rests on an unstated general
"implication" from the AUMF that directly contradicts express and specific language in
FISA. Specific and "carefully drawn" statutes prevail over general statutes where there
is a conflict. Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992) (quoting
International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481,494 (1987)). In FISA, Congress has
directly and specifically spoken on the question of domestic warrantless wiretapping,
including during wartime, and it could not have spoken more clearly.
As noted above, Congress has comprehensively regulated all electronic surveillance
in the United States, and authorizes such surveillance only pursuant to specific statutes
designated as the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted."
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(f) (emphasis added). Moreover, FISA specifically addresses the
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question of domestic wiretapping during wartime. In a provision entitled
"Authorization during time of war," FISA dictates that "[n]otwithstanding any other
law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information
for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the
Congress." 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (emphasis added). Thus, even where Congress has
declared war-a more formal step than an authorization such as the AUMF-the law
limits warrantless wiretapping to the first fifteen days of the conflict. Congress
explained that if the President needed further warrantless surveillance during wartime,
the fifteen days would be sufficient for Congress to consider and enact further
authorization.3 Rather than follow this course, the President acted unilaterally and
secretly in contravention of FISA's terms. The DOJ letter remarkably does not even
mention FISA's fifteen-day war provision, which directly refutes the President's
asserted "implied" authority.
In light of the specific and comprehensive regulation of FISA, especially the fifteen-
day war provision, there is no basis for finding in the AUMF's general language
implicit authority for unchecked warrantless domestic wiretapping. As Justice
Frankfurter stated in rejecting a similar argument by President Truman when he sought
to defend the seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War on the basis of implied
congressional authorization:
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and to say
that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress has
not addressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite impossible, however, when
Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of
seizure, to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power
which Congress consciously withheld. To find authority so explicitly withheld is
... to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of
authority between President and Congress.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
Second, the DOJ's argument would require the conclusion that Congress implicitly
and sub silentio repealed 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(f), the provision that identifies FISA and
specific criminal code provisions as "the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance... may be conducted." Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored;
they can be established only by "overwhelming evidence," J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 137 (2001), and "'the only permissible
justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are
irreconcilable,"' id. at 141-142 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550
3. 'The Conferees intend that this [ 15-day] period will allow time for consideration of any
amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency.... The conferees
expect that such amendment would be reported with recommendations within 7 days and that
each House would vote on the amendment within 7 days thereafter." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-
1720, at 34 (1978).
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(1974)). The AUMF and § 2511(2)(f) are not irreconcilable, and there is no evidence,
let alone overwhelming evidence, that Congress intended to repeal § 2511 (2)(f).
Third, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has admitted that the administration did
not seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA spying program because it was advised
that Congress would reject such an amendment.4 The administration cannot argue on
the one hand that Congress authorized the NSA program in the AUMF, and at the same
time that it did not ask Congress for such authorization because it feared Congress
would say no.5
Finally, the DOJ's reliance upon Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), to
support its reading of the AUMF, see DOJ Letter at 3, is misplaced. A plurality of the
Court in Hamdi held that the AUMF authorized military detention of enemy
combatants captured on the battlefield abroad as a "fundamental incident of waging
war." Id. at 519. The plurality expressly limited this holding to individuals who were
"part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in
Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there."
Id. at 516 (emphasis added). It is one thing, however, to say that foreign battlefield
capture of enemy combatants is an incident of waging war that Congress intended to
authorize. It is another matter entirely to treat unchecked warrantless domestic spying
as included in that authorization, especially where an existing statute specifies that
other laws are the "exclusive means" by which electronic surveillance may be
conducted and provides that even a declaration of war authorizes such spying only for
a fifteen-day emergency period.6
4. Attorney General Gonzales stated, "We have had discussions with Congress in the
past--certain members of Congress-as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow us
to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be difficult, if
not impossible." Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael
Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html.
5. The administration had a convenient vehicle for seeking any such amendment in the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, enacted in October 2001. The
Patriot Act amended FISA in several respects, including in sections 218 (allowing FISA
wiretaps in criminal investigations) and 215 (popularly known as the "libraries provision"). Yet
the administration did not ask Congress to amend FISA to authorize the warrantless electronic
surveillance at issue here.
6. The DOJ attempts to draw an analogy between FISA and 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which
provides that the United States may not detain a U.S. citizen "except pursuant to an act of
Congress." The DOJ argues that just as the AUMF was deemed to authorize the detention of
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519, so the AUMF satisfies FISA's requirement that electronic surveillance
be "authorized by statute." DOJ Letter at 3-4. The analogy is inapt. As noted above, FISA
specifically limits warrantless domestic wartime surveillance to the first fifteen days of the
conflict, and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) specifies that existing law is the "exclusive means" for
domestic wiretapping. Section 4001 (a), by contrast, neither expressly addresses detention of the
enemy during wartime nor attempts to create an exclusive mechanism for detention. Moreover,
the analogy overlooks the carefully limited holding and rationale of the Hamdi plurality, which
found the AUMF to be an "explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals
in the narrow category we describe .... who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as
part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network,"
and whom "Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF' 542 U.S. at 518. By the
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II. CONSTRUING FISA TO PROHIBIT WARRANTLESS DOMESTIC WIRETAPPING DOES
NOT RAISE ANY SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, WHEREAS CONSTRUING THE
AUMF TO AUTHORIZE SUCH WIRETAPPING WOULD RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The DOJ argues that FISA and the AUMF should be construed to permit the NSA
program's domestic surveillance because otherwise there might be a "conflict between
FISA and the President's Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief." DOJ Letter at
4. The statutory scheme described above is not ambiguous, and therefore the
constitutional avoidance doctrine is not even implicated. See United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001) (the "canon of constitutional
avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity"). But were it
implicated, it would work against the President, not in his favor. Construing FISA and
the AUMF according to their plain meanings raises no serious constitutional questions
regarding the President's duties under Article II. Construing the AUMF to permit
unchecked warrantless wiretapping without probable cause, however, would raise
serious questions under the Fourth Amendment.
A. FISA 's Limitations Are Consistent with the President's Article I Role
We do not dispute that, absent congressional action, the President might have
inherent constitutional authority to collect "signals intelligence" about the enemy
abroad. Nor do we dispute that, had Congress taken no action in this area, the President
might well be constitutionally empowered to conduct domestic surveillance directly
tied and narrowly confined to that goal-subject, of course, to Fourth Amendment
limits. Indeed, in the years before FISA was enacted, the federal law involving
wiretapping specifically provided that "[n]othing contained in this chapter or in section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the
President... to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976).
But FISA specifically repealed that provision. FISA § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1797, and
replaced it with language dictating that FISA and the criminal code are the "exclusive
means" of conducting electronic surveillance. In doing so, Congress did not deny that
the President has constitutional power to conduct electronic surveillance for national
security purposes; rather, Congress properly concluded that "even if the President has
the inherent authority in the absence of legislation to authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the
conduct of such surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure, which then
becomes the exclusive means by which such surveillance may be conducted." H.R.
Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978) (emphasis added). This analysis, Congress
noted, was "supported by two successive Attorneys General." Id.
To say that the President has inherent authority does not mean that his authority is
exclusive, or that his conduct is not subject to statutory regulations enacted (as FISA
was) pursuant to Congress's Article I powers. As Justice Jackson famously explained
in his influential opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 635
(Jackson, J., concurring), the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but
government's own admission, the NSA program is by no means so limited. See
Gonzales/Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 4.
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interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." For
example, the President in his role as Commander in Chief directs military operations.
But the Framers gave Congress the power to prescribe rules for the regulation of the
armed and naval forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and if a duly enacted statute prohibits the
military from engaging in torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the
President must follow that dictate. As Justice Jackson wrote, when the President acts in
defiance of "the expressed or implied will of Congress," his power is "at its lowest
ebb." 343 U.S. at 637. In this setting, Jackson wrote, "Presidential power [is] most
vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible constitutional postures." Id.
at 640.
Congress plainly has authority to regulate domestic wiretapping by federal agencies
under its Article I powers, and the DOJ does not suggest otherwise. Indeed, when FISA
was enacted, the Justice Department agreed that Congress had power to regulate such
conduct, and could require judicial approval of foreign intelligence surveillance. 7 FISA
does not prohibit foreign intelligence surveillance, but merely imposes reasonable
regulation to protect legitimate privacy rights. (For example, although FISA generally
requires judicial approval for electronic surveillance of persons within the United
States, it permits the executive branch to install a wiretap immediately so long as it
obtains judicial approval within 72 hours. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).)
Just as the President is bound by the statutory prohibition on torture, he is bound by
8the statutory dictates of FISA. The DOJ once infamously argued that the President as
Commander in Chief could ignore even the criminal prohibition on torture, 9 and, more
broadly still, that statutes may not "place any limits on the President's determinations
as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the
method, timing, and nature of the response."' But the administration withdrew the
August 2002 torture memo after it was disclosed, and for good reason the DOJ does
not advance these extreme arguments here. Absent a serious question about FISA's
7. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. I, at 16 (1977) (Congress's assertion of power to
regulate the President's authorization of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
was "concurred in by the Attorney General"); Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 31 (1978) (Letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Edward P. Boland, Chairman, House Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence (Apr. 18, 1978)) ("it seems unreasonable to conclude that
Congress, in the exercise of its powers in this area, may not vest in the courts the authority to
approve intelligence surveillance").
8. Indeed, Article II imposes on the President the general obligation to enforce laws that
Congress has validly enacted, including FISA: "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." (emphasis added). The use of the mandatory "shall" indicates that under our system
of separated powers, he is duty-bound to execute the provisions of FISA, not defy them.
9. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), at 31.
10. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Deputy Counsel to the President, Re: The President's Constitutional Authority
To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists And Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25,
2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm (emphasis added).
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constitutionality, there is no reason even to consider construing the AUMF to have
implicitly overturned the carefully designed regulatory regime that FISA establishes.
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993) (constitutional avoidance canon
applicable only if the constitutional question to be avoided is a serious one, "not to
eliminate all possible contentions that the statute might be unconstitutional") (emphasis
in original; citation omitted)."
B. Construing the A UMF to Authorize Warrantless Domestic Wiretapping Would
Raise Serious Constitutional Questions
The principle that ambiguous statutes should be construed to avoid serious
constitutional questions works against the administration, not in its favor. Interpreting
the AUMF and FISA to permit unchecked domestic wiretapping for the duration of the
conflict with al Qaeda would certainly raise serious constitutional questions. The
Supreme Court has never upheld such a sweeping power to invade the privacy of
Americans at home without individualized suspicion or judicial oversight.
The NSA surveillance program permits wiretapping within the United States
without either of the safeguards presumptively required by the Fourth Amendment for
electronic surveillance-individualized probable cause and a warrant or other order
issued by a judge or magistrate. The Court has long held that wiretaps generally require
a warrant and probable cause. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). And the
only time the Court considered the question of national security wiretaps, it held that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits domestic security wiretaps without those safeguards.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Although the Court in
that case left open the question of the Fourth Amendment validity of warrantless
wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes, its precedents raise serious constitutional
questions about the kind of open-ended authority the President has asserted with
respect to the NSA program. See id. at 316-18 (explaining difficulty of guaranteeing
Fourth Amendment freedoms if domestic surveillance can be conducted solely in the
discretion of the executive branch).
Indeed, serious Fourth Amendment questions about the validity of warrantless
wiretapping led Congress to enact FISA, in order to "provide the secure framework by
which the executive branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes within the context of this nation's commitment to privacy and
individual rights." S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977) (citing, inter alia, Zweibon v,
11. Three years ago, the FISA Court of Review suggested in dictum that Congress cannot
"encroach on the President's constitutional power" to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance.
In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FIS Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). The FISA
Court of Review, however, did not hold that FISA was unconstitutional, nor has any other court
suggested that FISA's modest regulations constitute an impermissible encroachment on
presidential authority. The FISA Court of Review relied upon United States v. Truong Dihn
Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980)-but that court did not suggest that the President's powers
were beyond congressional control. To the contrary, the Truong court indicated that FISA's
restrictions were constitutional. See 629 F.2d at 915 n.4 (noting that "the imposition of a
warrant requirement, beyond the constitutional minimum described in this opinion, should be
left to the intricate balancing performed in the course of the legislative process by Congress
and the President") (emphasis added).
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Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in which "the court of appeals held that a
warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that
is neither the agent of, nor acting in collaboration with, a foreign power").
Relying on In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, the DOJ argues that the NSA program
falls within an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement for reasonable
searches that serve "special needs" above and beyond ordinary law enforcement. But
the existence of "special needs" has never been found to permit warrantless
wiretapping. "Special needs" generally excuse the warrant and individualized suspicion
requirements only where those requirements are impracticable and the intrusion on
privacy is minimal. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
Wiretapping is not a minimal intrusion on privacy, and the experience of FISA shows
that foreign intelligence surveillance can be carried out through warrants based on
individualized suspicion.
The court in Sealed Case upheld FISA itself, which requires warrants issued by
Article III federal judges upon an individualized showing of probable cause that the
subject is an "agent of a foreign power." The NSA domestic spying program, by
contrast, includes none of these safeguards. It does not require individualized judicial
approval, and it does not require a showing that the target is an "agent of a foreign
power." According to Attorney General Gonzales, the NSA may wiretap any person in
the United States who so much as receives a communication from anyone abroad, if the
administration deems either of the parties to be affiliated with al Qaeda, a member of
an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, "working in support of al Qaeda," or "part of"
an organization or group "that is supportive of al Qaeda."'12 Under this reasoning, a
U.S. citizen living here who received a phone call from another U.S. citizen who
attends a mosque that the administration believes is "supportive" of al Qaeda could be
wiretapped without a warrant. The absence of meaningful safeguards on the NSA
program at a minimum raises serious questions about the validity of the program under
the Fourth Amendment, and therefore supports an interpretation of the AUMF that
does not undercut FISA's regulation of such conduct.
In conclusion, the DOJ letter fails to offer a plausible legal defense of the NSA
domestic spying program. If the Administration felt that FISA was insufficient, the
proper course was to seek legislative amendment, as it did with other aspects of FISA
in the Patriot Act, and as Congress expressly contemplated when it enacted the wartime
wiretap provision in FISA. One of the crucial features of a constitutional democracy is
that it is always open to the President-or anyone else-to seek to change the law. But
it is also beyond dispute that, in such a democracy, the President cannot simply violate
criminal laws behind closed doors because he deems them obsolete or impracticable.'
3
12. See Gonzales/Hayden Press Briefing, supra note 4.
13. During consideration of FISA, the House of Representatives noted that "the decision as
to the standards governing when and how foreign intelligence electronic surveillance should be
conducted is and should be a political decision, in the best sense of the term, because it involves
the weighing of important public policy concerns-civil liberties and national security. Such a
political decision is one properly made by the political branches of Government together, not
adopted by one branch on its own and with no regard for the other. Under our Constitution
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Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
As the President has explained, since shortly after the attacks of September 11,
2001, he has authorized the National Security Agency ("NSA") to intercept
international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al
Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. The purpose of these intercepts is to establish
an early warning system to detect and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack on
the United States. This paper addresses, in an unclassified form, the legal basis for the
NSA activities described by the President ("NSA activities").
SUMMARY
On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched the deadliest
foreign attack on American soil in history. Al Qaeda's leadership repeatedly has
pledged to attack the United States again at a time of its choosing, and these terrorist
organizations continue to pose a grave threat to the United States. In response to the
September 1 1th attacks and the continuing threat, the President, with broad
congressional approval, has acted to protect the Nation from another terrorist attack. In
the immediate aftermath of September 11 th, the President promised that "[w]e will
direct every resource at our command-every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every tool of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every
weapon of war-to the destruction of and to the defeat of the global terrorist network."
President Bush Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001). The NSA
activities are an indispensable aspect of this defense of the Nation. By targeting the
international communications into and out of the United States of persons reasonably
believed to be linked to al Qaeda, these activities provide the United States with an
early warning system to help avert the next attack. For the following reasons, the NSA
activities are lawful and consistent with civil liberties.
The NSA activities are supported by the President's well-recognized inherent
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and sole organ for the Nation in
foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence
purposes to detect and disrupt armed attacks on the United States. The President has
the chief responsibility under the Constitution to protect America from attack, and the
Constitution gives the President the authority necessary to fulfill that solemn
responsibility. The President has made clear that he will exercise all authority available
to him, consistent with the Constitution, to protect the people of the United States.
In the specific context of the current armed conflict with al Qaeda and related
terrorist organizations, Congress by statute has confirmed and supplemented the
President's recognized authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct such
warrantless surveillance to prevent further catastrophic attacks on the homeland. In its
first legislative response to the terrorist attacks of September 1 th, Congress authorized
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the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks" of September 1 th in order to prevent "any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States." Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (reported as a note to 50
U.S.C.A. § 1541) ("AUMF"). History conclusively demonstrates that warrantless
communications intelligence targeted at the enemy in time of armed conflict is a
traditional and fundamental incident of the use of military force authorized by the
AUMF. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the AUMF in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004), confirms that Congress in the AUMF gave its express approval to the
military conflict against al Qaeda and its allies and thereby to the President's use of all
traditional and accepted incidents of force in this current military conflict-including
warrantless electronic surveillance to intercept enemy communications both at home
and abroad. This understanding of the AUMF demonstrates Congress's support for the
President's authority to protect the Nation and, at the same time, adheres to Justice
O'Connor's admonition that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President,"
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion), particularly in view of the narrow scope of
the NSA activities.
The AUMF places the President at the zenith of his powers in authorizing the NSA
activities. Under the tripartite framework set forth by Justice Jackson in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring),
Presidential authority is analyzed to determine whether the President is acting in
accordance with congressional authorization (category I), whether he acts in the
absence of a grant or denial of authority by Congress (category II), or whether he uses
his own authority under the Constitution to take actions incompatible with
congressional measures (category III). Because of the broad authorization provided in
the AUMF, the President's action here falls within category I of Justice Jackson's
framework. Accordingly, the President's power in authorizing the NSA activities is at
its height because he acted "pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress," and his power "includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate." Id. at 635.
The NSA activities are consistent with the preexisting statutory framework
generally applicable to the interception of communications in the United States-the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862
(2000 & Supp. H 2002), and relevant related provisions in chapter 119 of title 18.'
Although FISA generally requires judicial approval of electronic surveillance, FISA
also contemplates that Congress may authorize such surveillance by a statute other than
FISA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (prohibiting any person from intentionally "engag[ing].
.. in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute"). The
AUMF, as construed by the Supreme Court in Hamdi and as confirmed by the history
and tradition of armed conflict, is just such a statute. Accordingly, electronic
surveillance conducted by the President pursuant to the AUMF, including the NSA
1. Chapter 119 of title 18, which was enacted by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2000 & West Supp. 2005),
is often referred to as "Title III."
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activities, is fully consistent with FISA and falls within category I of Justice Jackson's
framework.
Even if there were ambiguity about whether FISA, read together with the AUMF,
permits the President to authorize the NSA activities, the canon of constitutional
avoidance requires reading these statutes in harmony to overcome any restrictions in
FISA and Title III, at least as they might otherwise apply to the congressionally
authorized armed conflict with al Qaeda. Indeed, were FISA and Title Il interpreted to
impede the President's ability to use the traditional tool of electronic surveillance to
detect and prevent future attacks by a declared enemy that has already struck at the
homeland and is engaged in ongoing operations against the United States, the
constitutionality of FISA, as applied to that situation, would be called into very serious
doubt. In fact, if this difficult constitutional question had to be addressed, FISA would
be unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context. Importantly, the FISA Court of
Review itself recognized just three years ago that the President retains constitutional
authority to conduct foreign surveillance apart from the FISA framework, and the
President is certainly entitled, at a minimum, to rely on that judicial interpretation of
the Constitution and FISA.
Finally, the NSA activities fully comply with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The interception of communications described by the President falls
within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement and satisfies the Fourth
Amendment's fundamental requirement of reasonableness. The NSA activities are thus
constitutionally permissible and fully protective of civil liberties.
BACKGROUND
A. The Attacks of September 11, 2001
On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set of
coordinated attacks along the East Coast of the United States. Four commercial
jetliners, each carefully selected to be fully loaded with fuel for a transcontinental
flight, were hijacked by al Qaeda operatives. Two of the jetliners were targeted at the
Nation's financial center in New York and were deliberately flown into the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center. The third was targeted at the headquarters of the
Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon. The fourth was apparently headed toward
Washington, D.C., when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The intended target of this fourth jetliner was evidently
the White House or the Capitol, strongly suggesting that its intended mission was to
strike a decapitation blow on the Government of the United States-to kill the
President, the Vice President, or Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11th
resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths-the highest single-day death toll from hostile
foreign attacks in the Nation's history. These attacks shut down air travel in the United
States, disrupted the Nation's financial markets and government operations, and caused
billions of dollars in damage to the economy.
On September 14, 2001, the President declared a national emergency "by reason of
the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the
Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United
States." Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001). The same day,
Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President "to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
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planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of September 11 th,
which the President signed on September 18th. AUMF § 2(a). Congress also expressly
acknowledged that the attacks rendered it "necessary and appropriate" for the United
States to exercise its right "to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad,"
and in particular recognized that "the President has authority under the Constitution to
take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States." Id. pmbl. Congress emphasized that the attacks "continue to pose an unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States." Id. The United States also launched a large-scale military response, both at
home and abroad. In the United States, combat air patrols were immediately
established over major metropolitan areas and were maintained 24 hours a day until
April 2002. The United States also immediately began plans for a military response
directed at al Qaeda's base of operations in Afghanistan. Acting under his
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, and with the support of Congress, the
President dispatched forces to Afghanistan and, with the assistance of the Northern
Alliance, toppled the Taliban regime.
As the President made explicit in his Military Order of November 13, 2001,
authorizing the use of military commissions to try terrorists, the attacks of September
11 th "created a state of armed conflict." Military Order § l(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833
(Nov. 13, 2001). Indeed, shortly after the attacks, NATO-for the first time in its 46-
year history-invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an
"armed attack against one or more of [the parties] shall be considered an attack against
them all." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244,34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246; see also Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sO I1002a.htm ("[I]t has now
been determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed
from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty .... "). The President also determined in his Military Order that al
Qaeda and related terrorists organizations "possess both the capability and the
intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not
detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction
of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
Government," and concluded that "an extraordinary emergency exists for national
defense purposes." Military Order, § 1(c), (g), 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833-34.
B. The NSA Activities
Against this unfolding background of events in the fall of 2001, there was
substantial concern that al Qaeda and its allies were preparing to carry out another
attack within the United States. Al Qaeda had demonstrated its ability to introduce
agents into the United States undetected and to perpetrate devastating attacks, and it
was suspected that additional agents were likely already in position within the Nation's
borders. As the President has explained, unlike a conventional enemy, al Qaeda has
infiltrated "our cities and communities and communicated from here in America to plot
and plan with bin Laden's lieutenants in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere." Press
Conference of President Bush (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html ("President's Press Conference").
To this day, finding al Qaeda sleeper agents in the United States remains one of the
paramount concerns in the War on Terror. As the President has explained, "[tihe
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terrorists want to strike America again, and they hope to inflict even more damage than
they did on September the 11 th." Id.
The President has acknowledged that, to counter this threat, he has authorized the
NSA to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of
persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. The same day, the
Attorney General elaborated and explained that in order to intercept a communication,
there must be "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a
member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated
with al Qaeda." Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General
Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html (Dec. 19,2005)
(statement of Attorney General Gonzales). The purpose of these intercepts is to
establish an early warning system to detect and prevent another catastrophic terrorist
attack on the United States. The President has stated that the NSA activities "ha[ve]
been effective in disrupting the enemy, while safeguarding our civil liberties."
President's Press Conference.
The President has explained that the NSA activities are "critical" to the national
security of the United States. Id. Confronting al Qaeda "is not simply a matter of
[domestic] law enforcement"-we must defend the country against an enemy that
declared war against the United States. Id. To "effectively detect enemies hiding in our
midst and prevent them from striking us again... we must be able to act fast and to
detect conversations [made by individuals linked to al Qaeda] so we can prevent new
attacks." Id. The President pointed out that "a two-minute phone conversation between
somebody linked to al Qaeda here and an operative overseas could lead directly to the
loss of thousands of lives." Id. The NSA activities are intended to help "connect the
dots" between potential terrorists. Id. In addition, the Nation is facing "a different era,
a different war. .. people are changing phone numbers .. .and they're moving
quick[ly]." Id. As the President explained, the NSA activities "enable[] us to move
faster and quicker. And that's important. We've got to be fast on our feet, quick to
detect and prevent." Id. "This is an enemy that is quick and it's lethal. And sometimes
we have to move very, very quickly." Id. FISA, by contrast, is better suited "for long-
term monitoring." Id.
As the President has explained, the NSA activities are "carefully reviewed
approximately every 45 days to ensure that [they are] being used properly." Id. These
activities are reviewed for legality by the Department of Justice and are monitored by
the General Counsel and Inspector General of the NSA to ensure that civil liberties are
being protected. Id. Leaders in Congress from both parties have been briefed more than
a dozen times on the NSA activities.
C. The Continuing Threat Posed by Al Qaeda
Before the September 11 th attacks, al Qaeda had promised to attack the United
States. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared a "religious" war against the United States
and urged that it was the moral obligation of all Muslims to kill U.S. civilians and
military personnel. See Statement of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al.,
Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans, published in Al-Quds al-'Arabi (Feb. 23,
1998) ('To kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military-is an individual
duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in
order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order
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for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten
any Muslim."). Al Qaeda carried out those threats with a vengeance; they attacked the
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, the United States Embassy in Nairobi, and finally the United
States itself in the September 11 th attacks.
It is clear that al Qaeda is not content with the damage it wrought on September
11 th. As recently as December 7, 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri professed that al Qaeda "is
spreading, growing, and becoming stronger," and that al Qaeda is "waging a great
historic battle in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and even in the Crusaders' own homes."
Ayman al-Zawahiri, videotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Dec. 7,
2005). Indeed, since September 1 th, al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly promised to
deliver another, even more devastating attack on America. See, e.g., Osama bin Laden,
videotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Oct. 24, 2004) (warning United
States citizens of further attacks and asserting that "your security is in your own
hands"); Osama bin Laden, videotape released on Al-Jazeera television network (Oct.
18, 2003) ("We, God willing, will continue to fight you and will continue martyrdom
operations inside and outside the United States .... ."); Ayman A-Zawahiri, videotape
released on the Al-Jazeera television network (Oct. 9, 2002) ("I promise you
[addressing the 'citizens of the United States'] that the Islamic youth are preparing for
you what will fill your hearts with horror"). Given that al Qaeda's leaders have
repeatedly made good on their threats and that al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to
insert foreign agents into the United States to execute attacks, it is clear that the threat
continues. Indeed, since September 11 th, al Qaeda has staged several large-scale
attacks around the world, including in Indonesia, Madrid, and London, killing
hundreds of innocent people.
ANALYSIS
I. THE PRESIDENT HAS INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ORDER
WARRANTLESS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
As Congress expressly recognized in the AUMF, "the President has authority under
the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
against the United States," AUMF pmbl., especially in the context of the current
conflict. Article II of the Constitution vests in the President all executive power of the
United States, including the power to act as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, and authority over the conduct of the Nation's foreign
affairs. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[tihe President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). In this way, the Constitution grants the President inherent
power to protect the Nation from foreign attack, see, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 668 (1863), and to protect national security information, see, e.g.,
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
To carry out these responsibilities, the President must have authority to gather
information necessary for the execution of his office. The Founders, after all, intended
the federal Government to be clothed with all authority necessary to protect the Nation.
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.
1961) (explaining that the federal Government will be "cloathed with all the powers
requisite to the complete execution of its trust"); id. No. 41, at 269 (James Madison)
20063 1379
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
("Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society ....
The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal
councils."). Because of the structural advantages of the Executive Branch, the
Founders also intended that the President would have the primary responsibility and
necessary authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the Nation
and to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70, at 471-72
(Alexander Hamilton); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950)
("this [constitutional] grant of war power includes all that is necessary and proper for
carrying these powers into execution") (citation omitted). Thus, it has been long
recognized that the President has the authority to use secretive means to collect
intelligence necessary for the conduct of foreign affairs and military campaigns. See,
e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The
President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs,
has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published
to the world."); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 ("He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials."); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876) (President "was
undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief.., to employ secret
agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the strength, resources,
and movements of the enemy").
In reliance on these principles, a consistent understanding has developed that the
President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and
surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. Wiretaps for
such purposes thus have been authorized by Presidents at least since the administration
of Franklin Roosevelt in 1940. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court,
444 F.2d 651, 669-71 (6th Cir. 1971) (reproducing as an appendix memoranda from
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson). In a Memorandum to Attorney General
Jackson, President Roosevelt wrote on May 21, 1940:
You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may approve, after
investigation of the need in each case, to authorize the necessary investigation
agents that they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices directed to
the conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive
activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies.
You are requested furthermore to limit these investigations so conducted to a
minimum and limit them insofar as possible to aliens.
Id. at 670 (appendix A). President Truman approved a memorandum drafted by
Attorney General Tom Clark in which the Attorney General advised that "it is as
necessary as it was in 1940 to take the investigative measures" authorized by President
Roosevelt to conduct electronic surveillance "in cases vitally affecting the domestic
security." Id. Indeed, while FISA was being debated during the Carter Administration,
Attorney General Griffin Bell testified that "the current bill recognizes no inherent
power of the President to conduct electronic surveillance, and I want to interpolate here
to say that this does not take away the power [of] the President under the
Constitution." Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on
H.R. 5764, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation
of the House Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (emphasis added);
see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967) (White, J., concurring)
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("Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive
Presidents."); cf. Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before
the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 61 (1994)
(statement of Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick) ("[T]he Department of
Justice believes, and the case law supports, that the President has inherent authority to
conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes . . ").
The courts uniformly have approved this longstanding Executive Branch practice.
Indeed, every federal appellate court to rule on the question has concluded that, even in
peacetime, the President has inherent constitutional authority, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, to conduct searches for foreign intelligence purposes without
securing a judicial warrant. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Intel.
Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002) ("[AIll the other courts to have decided the issue [have] held
that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain
foreign intelligence information .... We take for granted that the President does have
that authority and, assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President's
constitutional power.") (emphasis added); accord, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.
1974) (en banc); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). But cf.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (dictum in plurality
opinion suggesting that a warrant would be required even in a foreign intelligence
investigation).
In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (the "Keith"
case), the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
applies to investigations of wholly domestic threats to security-such as domestic
political violence and other crimes. But the Court in the Keith case made clear that it
was not addressing the President's authority to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance without a warrant and that it was expressly reserving that question: "[T]he
instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance power
with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country." Id. at
308; see also id. at 321-22 & n.20 ("We have not addressed, and express no opinion as
to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or
their agents."). That Keith does not apply in the context of protecting against a foreign
attack has been confirmed by the lower courts. After Keith, each of the three courts of
appeals that have squarely considered the question have concluded-expressly taking
the Supreme Court's decision into account-that the President has inherent authority to
conduct warrantless surveillance in the foreign intelligence context. See, e.g., Truong
Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 913-14; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603; Brown, 484 F.2d 425-26.
From a constitutional standpoint, foreign intelligence surveillance such as the NSA
activities differs fundamentally from the domestic security surveillance at issue in
Keith. As the Fourth Circuit observed, the President has uniquely strong constitutional
powers in matters pertaining to foreign affairs and national security. "Perhaps most
crucially, the executive branch not only has superior expertise in the area of foreign
intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in
foreign affairs." Truong, 629 F.2d at 914; see id. at 913 (noting that "the needs of the
executive are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area of
domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would.., unduly frustrate the
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President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities"); cf. Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 292 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national
security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."). 2
The present circumstances that support recognition of the President's inherent
constitutional authority to conduct the NSA activities are considerably stronger than
were the circumstances at issue in the earlier courts of appeals cases that recognized
this power. All of the cases described above addressed inherent executive authority
under the foreign affairs power to conduct surveillance in a peacetime context. The
courts in these cases therefore had no occasion even to consider the fundamental
authority of the President, as Commander in Chief, to gather intelligence in the context
of an ongoing armed conflict in which the United States already had suffered massive
civilian casualties and in which the intelligence gathering efforts at issue were
specifically designed to thwart further armed attacks. Indeed, intelligence gathering is
particularly important in the current conflict, in which the enemy attacks largely
through clandestine activities and which, as Congress recognized, "posefs] an unusual
and extraordinary threat," AUMF pmbl.
Among the President's most basic constitutional duties is the duty to protect the
Nation from armed attack. The Constitution gives him all necessary authority to fulfill
that responsibility. The courts thus have long acknowledged the President's inherent
authority to take action to protect Americans abroad, see, e.g., Durand v. Hollins, 8 F.
Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186), and to protect the Nation from attack,
see, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668. See generally Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
28 (1942) (recognizing that the President has authority under the Constitution "to
direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by
the military arm of the nation in time of war," including "important incident[s] to the
conduct of war," such as "the adoption of measures by the military command... to
repel and defeat the enemy"). As the Supreme Court emphasized in the Prize Cases, if
the Nation is invaded, the President is "bound to resist force by force"; "[hie must
determine what degree of force the crisis demands" and need not await congressional
sanction to do so. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670; see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19,27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring) ("[T]he Prize Cases ... stand
for the proposition that the President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts
by third parties even without specific congressional authorization, and courts may not
review the level of force selected."); id. at 40 (Tatel, J., concurring) ("[T]he President,
as commander in chief, possesses emergency authority to use military force to defend
2. Keith made clear that one of the significant concerns driving the Court's conclusion in
the domestic security context was the inevitable connection between perceived threats to
domestic security and political dissent. As the Court explained: "Fourth Amendment protections
become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the
Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect 'domestic
security."' Keith, 407 U.S. at 314; see also id. at 320 ("Security surveillances are especially
sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily
broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such
surveillances to oversee political dissent."). Surveillance of domestic groups raises a First
Amendment concern that generally is not present when the subjects of the surveillance are
foreign powers or their agents.
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the nation from attack without obtaining prior congressional approval."). Indeed, "in
virtue of his rank as head of the forces, [the President] has certain powers and duties
with which Congress cannot interfere." Training of British Flying Students in the
United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 61 (1941) (Attorney General Robert H. Jackson)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In exercising his constitutional powers, the
President has wide discretion, consistent with the Constitution, over the methods of
gathering intelligence about the Nation's enemies in a time of armed conflict.
II. THE AUMF CONFIRMS AND SUPPLEMENTS THE PRESIDENT'S INHERENT POWER
TO USE WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE AGAINST THE ENEMY IN THE CURRENT
ARMED CONFLICT
In the Authorization for Use of Military Force enacted in the wake of September
1 th, Congress confirms and supplements the President's constitutional authority to
protect the Nation, including through electronic surveillance, in the context of the
current post-September 11 th armed conflict with al Qaeda and its allies. The broad
language of the AUMF affords the President, at a minimum, discretion to employ the
traditional incidents of the use of military force. The history of the President's use of
warrantless surveillance during armed conflicts demonstrates that the NSA surveillance
described by the President is a fundamental incident of the use of military force that is
necessarily included in the AUMF.
A. The Text and Purpose of the A UMF Authorize the NSA Activities
On September 14, 2001, in its first legislative response to the attacks of September
1 th, Congress gave its express approval to the President's military campaign against
al Qaeda and, in the process, confirmed the well-accepted understanding of the
President's Article II powers. See AUMF § 2(a).3 In the preamble to the AUMF,
Congress stated that "the President has authority under the Constitution to take action
to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States," AUMF
pmbl., and thereby acknowledged the President's inherent constitutional authority to
defend the United States. This clause "constitutes an extraordinarily sweeping
recognition of independent presidential constitutional power to employ the war power
to combat terrorism." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 Const.
Comment. 215, 252 (2002). This striking recognition of presidential authority cannot
be discounted as the product of excitement in the immediate aftermath of September
1 th, for the same terms were repeated by Congress more than a year later in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Pub. L. No.
107-243, pmbl., 116 Stat. 1498, 1500 (Oct. 16, 2002) ("[T]he President has authority
under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States .. "). In the context of the conflict with al Qaeda
and related terrorist organizations, therefore, Congress has acknowledged a broad
executive authority to "deter and prevent" further attacks against the United States.
3. America's military response began before the attacks of September 11th had been
completed. See The 9/11 Commission Report 20 (2004). Combat air patrols were established
and authorized "to engage inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked."
Id. at 42.
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The AUMF passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, does not lend itself to a
narrow reading. Its expansive language authorizes the President "to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001." AUMF § 2(a) (emphases added). In the field of foreign affairs,
and particularly that of war powers and national security, congressional enactments are
to be broadly construed where they indicate support for authority long asserted and
exercised by the Executive Branch. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-303
(1981); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,543-45 (1950); cf.
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996) (noting that the usual "limitations
on delegation [of congressional powers] do not apply" to authorizations linked to the
Commander in Chief power); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,678-82 (1981)
(even where there is no express statutory authorization for executive action, legislation
in related field may be construed to indicate congressional acquiescence in that action).
Although Congress's war powers under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
empower Congress to legislate regarding the raising, regulation, and material support
of the Armed Forces and related matters, rather than the prosecution of military
campaigns, the AUMF indicates Congress's endorsement of the President's use of his
constitutional war powers. This authorization transforms the struggle against al Qaeda
and related terrorist organizations from what Justice Jackson called "a zone of
twilight," in which the President and the Congress may have concurrent powers whose
"distribution is uncertain," Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), into a situation in which the President's authority
is at is maximum because "it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate," id. at 635. With regard to these fundamental tools of
warfare-and, as demonstrated below, warrantless electronic surveillance against the
declared enemy is one such tool-the AUMF places the President's authority at its
zenith under Youngstown.
It is also clear that the AUMF confirms and supports the President's use of those
traditional incidents of military force against the enemy, wherever they may be-on
United States soil or abroad. The nature of the September 1 lth attacks-launched on
United States soil by foreign agents secreted in the United States-necessitates such
authority, and the text of the AUMF confirms it. The operative terms of the AUMF
state that the President is authorized to use force "in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States," id., an objective which, given the
recent attacks within the Nation's borders and the continuing use of air defense
throughout the country at the time Congress acted, undoubtedly contemplated the
possibility of military action within the United States. The preamble, moreover, recites
that the United States should exercise its rights "to protect United States citizens both
at home and abroad." Id. pmbl. (emphasis added). To take action against those linked
to the September 1 th attacks involves taking action against individuals within the
United States. The United States had been attacked on its own soil-not by aircraft
launched from carriers several hundred miles away, but by enemy agents who had
resided in the United States for months. A crucial responsibility of the President-
charged by the AUMF and the Constitution-was and is to identify and attack those
enemies, especially if they were in the United States, ready to strike against the Nation.
The text of the AUMF demonstrates in an additional way that Congress authorized
the President to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance against the enemy. The
terms of the AUMF not only authorized the President to "use all necessary and
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appropriate force" against those responsible for the September 11 th attacks; it also
authorized the President to "determine[]" the persons or groups responsible for those
attacks and to take all actions necessary to prevent further attacks. AUMF § 2(a) ("the
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 1 th, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons") (emphasis added). Of vital importance to the use of force against the
enemy is locating the enemy and identifying its plans of attack. And of vital importance
to identifying the enemy and detecting possible future plots was the authority to
intercept communications to or from the United States of persons with links to al
Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. Given that the agents who carried out the
initial attacks resided in the United States and had successfully blended into American
society and disguised their identities and intentions until they were ready to strike, the
necessity of using the most effective intelligence gathering tools against such an
enemy, including electronic surveillance, was patent. Indeed, Congress recognized that
the enemy in this conflict poses an "unusual and extraordinary threat." AUMF pmbl.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the AUMF in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), strongly supports this reading of the AUMF. In
Hamdi, five members of the Court found that the AUMF authorized the detention of an
American within the United States, notwithstanding a statute that prohibits the
detention of U.S. citizens "except pursuant to an Act of Congress," 18 U.S.C. §
4001(a). See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (plurality opinion); id. at 587 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Drawing on historical materials and "longstanding law-of-war principles,"
id. at 518-21, a plurality of the Court concluded that detention of combatants who
fought against the United States as part of an organization "known to have supported"
al Qaeda "is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use." Id. at
518; see also id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality that the
joint resolution authorized the President to "detain those arrayed against our troops");
accord Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-29, 38 (recognizing the President's authority to capture
and try agents of the enemy in the United States even if they had never "entered the
theatre or zone of active military operations"). Thus, even though the AUMF does not
say anything expressly about detention, the Court nevertheless found that it satisfied
section 4001(a)'s requirement that detention be congressionally authorized.
The conclusion of five Justices in Hamdi that the AUMF incorporates fundamental
"incidents" of the use of military force makes clear that the absence of any specific
reference to signals intelligence activities in the resolution is immaterial. See Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 519 ("[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language
of detention.") (plurality opinion). Indeed, given the circumstances in which the
AUMF was adopted, it is hardly surprising that Congress chose to speak about the
President's authority in general terms. The purpose of the AUMF was for Congress to
sanction and support the military response to the devastating terrorist attacks that had
occurred just three days earlier. Congress evidently thought it neither necessary nor
appropriate to attempt to catalog every specific aspect of the use of the forces it was
authorizing and every potential preexisting statutory limitation on the Executive
Branch. Rather than engage in that difficult and impractical exercise, Congress
authorized the President, in general but intentionally broad terms, to use the traditional
and fundamental incidents of war and to determine how best to identify and engage the
enemy in the current armed conflict. Congress's judgment to proceed in this manner
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was unassailable, for, as the Supreme Court has recognized, even in normal times
involving no major national security crisis, "Congress cannot anticipate and legislate
with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take."
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. Indeed, Congress often has enacted authorizations
to use military force using general authorizing language that 'does not purport to
catalogue in detail the specific powers the President may employ. The need for
Congress to speak broadly in recognizing and augmenting the President's core
constitutional powers over foreign affairs and military campaigns is of course
significantly heightened in times of national emergency. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
17 (1965) ("[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary
international relations... Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of
foreign affairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas.").
Hamdi thus establishes the proposition that the AUMF "clearly and unmistakably"
authorizes the President to take actions against al Qaeda and related organizations that
amount to "fundamental incident[s] of waging war." Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In other words, "[tihe clear
inference is that the A UMF authorizes what the laws of war permit." Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 2048, 2092 (2005) (emphasis added). Congress is presumed to be aware
of the Supreme Court's precedents. Indeed, Congress recently enacted legislation in
response to the Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)-which was
issued the same day as the Hamdi decision-removing habeas corpus jurisdiction over
claims filed on behalf of confined enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay.
Congress, however, has not expressed any disapproval of the Supreme Court's
commonsense and plain-meaning interpretation of the AUMF in Hamdi.
4
B. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance Aimed at Intercepting Enemy
Communications Has Long Been Recongnized as a Fundamental Incident of the
Use of Military Force
The history of warfare-including the consistent practice of Presidents since the
earliest days of the Republic-demonstrates that warrantless intelligence surveillance
against the enemy is a fundamental incident of the use of military force, and this history
confirms the statutory authority provided by the AUMF. Electronic surveillance is a
fundamental tool of war that must be included in any natural reading of the AUMF's
authorization to use "all necessary and appropriate force."
As one author has explained:
4. This understanding of the AUMF is consistent with Justice O'Connor's admonition that
"a state of war is not a blank check for the President," Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality
opinion). In addition to constituting a fundamental and accepted incident of the use of military
force, the NSA activities are consistent with the law of armed conflict principle that the use of
force be necessary and proportional. See Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts 115 (1995). The NSA activities are proportional because they are minimally
invasive and narrow in scope, targeting only the international communications of persons
reasonably believed to be linked to al Qaeda, and are designed to protect the Nation from a
devastating attack.
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It is essential in warfare for a belligerent to be as fully informed as possible about
the enemy-his strength, his weaknesses, measures taken by him and measures
contemplated by him. This applies not only to military matters, but... anything
which bears on and is material to his ability to wage the war in which he is
engaged. The laws of war recognize and sanction this aspect of warfare.
Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 325 (1959) (emphases added);
see also Memorandum for Members of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intel.,
from Jeffrey H. Smith, Re: Legal Authorities Regarding Warrantless Surveillance of
U.S. Persons 6 (Jan. 3, 2006) ("Certainly, the collection of intelligence is understood
to be necessary to the execution of the war."). Similarly, article 24 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907 expressly states that "the employment of measures necessary for
obtaining information about the enemy and the country [is] considered permissible."
See also L. Oppenheim, International Law vol. II § 159 (7th ed. 1952) ("War cannot
be waged without all kinds of information, about the forces and the intentions of the
enemy .... To obtain the necessary information, it has always been considered lawful
to employ spies . . . ."); Joseph R. Baker & Henry G. Crocker, The Laws of Land
Warfare 197 (1919) ("Every belligerent has a right... to discover the signals of the
enemy and... to seek to procure information regarding the enemy through the aid of
secret agents."); cf. J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land 205 (1911) ("[E]very nation
employs spies; were a nation so quixotic as to refrain from doing so, it might as well
sheathe its sword for ever.... Spies ... are indispensably necessary to a general; and,
other things being equal, that commander will be victorious who has the best secret
service.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In accordance with these well-established principles, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the President's authority to conduct intelligence activities. See,
e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876) (recognizing President's
authority to hire spies); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (reaffirming Totten and
counseling against judicial interference with such matters); see also Chicago & S. Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ('The President, both as
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available
intelligence services whose reports neither are not and ought not to be published to the
world."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936) (The
President "has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular, and other officials."). Chief Justice John Marshall even described
the gathering of intelligence as a military duty. See Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947,952-
53 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("As Chief Justice John Marshall said of Washington, 'A general
must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate his measures by his
information. It is his duty to obtain correct information ..... ') (quoting Foreword,
U.S. Army Basic Field Manual, Vol. X, circa 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S.
1(1972).
The United States, furthermore, has a long history of wartime surveillance-a
history that can be traced to George Washington, who "was a master of military
espionage" and "made frequent and effective use of secret intelligence in the second
half of the eighteenth century." Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Cloak and Dollar: A History of
American Secret Intelligence 11 (2002); see generally id. at 11-23 (recounting
Washington's use of intelligence); see also Haig v. Agee, 471 U.S. 159, 172 n.16
(1981) (quoting General Washington's letter to an agent embarking upon an
intelligence mission in 1777: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence, is apparent
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and need not be further urged."). As President in 1790, Washington obtained from
Congress a "secret fund" to deal with foreign dangers and to be spent at his discretion.
Jeffreys-Jones, supra, at 22. The fund, which remained in use until the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-twentieth century and gained "longstanding
acceptance within our constitutional structure," Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 158-59
(D.C. Cir. 1980), was used "for all purposes to which a secret service fund should or
could be applied for the public benefit," including "for persons sent publicly and
secretly to search for important information, political or commercial," id. at 159
(quoting Statement of Senator John Forsyth, Cong. Debates 295 (Feb. 25, 1831)). See
also Totten, 92 U.S. at 107 (refusing to examine payments from this fund lest the
publicity make a "secret service" "impossible").
The interception of communications, in particular, has long been accepted as a
fundamental method for conducting wartime surveillance. See, e.g., Greenspan, supra,
at 326 (accepted and customary means for gathering intelligence "include air
reconnaissance and photography; ground reconnaissance; observation of enemy
positions; interception of enemy messages, wireless and other, examination of captured
documents; ... and interrogation of prisoners and civilian inhabitants") (emphasis
added). Indeed, since its independence, the United States has intercepted
communications for wartime intelligence purposes and, if necessary, has done so
within its own borders. During the Revolutionary War, for example, George
Washington received and used to his advantage reports from American intelligence
agents on British military strength, British strategic intentions, and British estimates of
American strength. See Jeffreys-Jones, supra, at 13. One source of Washington's
intelligence was intercepted British mail. See Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence
in the War ofIndependence 31, 32 (1997). In fact, Washington himself proposed that
one of his Generals "contrive a means of opening [British letters] without breaking the
seals, take copies of the contents, and then let them go on." Id. at 32 ("From that point
on, Washington was privy to British intelligence pouches between New York and
Canada."); see generally Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee"), S. Rep.
No. 94-755, at Book VI, 9-17 (Apr. 23, 1976) (describing Washington's intelligence
activities).
More specifically, warrantless electronic surveillance of wartime communications
has been conducted in the United States since electronic communications have existed,
i.e., since at least the Civil War, when "[tielegraph wiretapping was common, and an
important intelligence source for both sides." G.J.A. O'Toole, The Encyclopedia of
American Intelligence and Espionage 498 (1988). Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart
even "had his own personal wiretapper travel along with him in the field" to intercept
military telegraphic communications. Samuel Dash, et al., The Eavesdroppers 23
(1971); see also O'Toole, supra, at 121, 385-88, 496-98 (discussing Civil War
surveillance methods such as wiretaps, reconnaissance balloons, semaphore
interception, and cryptanalysis). Similarly, there was extensive use of electronic
surveillance during the Spanish-American War. See Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the
Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941, at
62 (1986). When an American expeditionary force crossed into northern Mexico to
confront the forces of Pancho Villa in 1916, the Army "frequently intercepted
messages of the regime in Mexico City or the forces contesting its rule." David
Alvarez, Secret Messages 6-7 (2000). Shortly after Congress declared war on Germany
in World War I, President Wilson (citing only his constitutional powers and the joint
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resolution declaring war) ordered the censorship of messages sent outside the United
States via submarine cables, telegraph, and telephone lines. See Exec. Order No. 2604
(Apr. 28, 1917). During that war, wireless telegraphy "enabled each belligerent to tap
the messages of the enemy." Bidwell, supra, at 165 (quoting statement of Col. W.
Nicolai, former head of the Secret Service of the High Command of the German Army,
in W. Nicolai, The German Secret Service 21 (1924)).
As noted in Part I, on May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt authorized warrantless
electronic surveillance of persons suspected of subversive activities, including spying,
against the United States. In addition, on December 8, 1941, the day after the attack on
Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt gave the Director of the FBI "temporary powers to
direct all news censorship and to control all other telecommunications traffic in and
out of the United States." Jack A. Gottschalk, "Consistent with Security".... A
History of American Military Press Censorship, 5 Comm. & L. 35, 39 (1983)
(emphasis added). See Memorandum for the Secretaries of War, Navy, State, and
Treasury, the Postmaster General, and the Federal Communications Commission from
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Dec. 8, 1941). President Roosevelt soon supplanted that
temporary regime by establishing an office for conducting such electronic surveillance
in accordance with the War Powers Act of 1941. See Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 303, 55
Stat. 838, 840-41 (Dec. 18, 1941); Gottschalk, 5 Comm. & L. at 40. The President's
order gave the Government of the United States access to "communications by mail,
cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any
foreign country." Id. See also Exec. Order No. 8985, § 1, 6 Fed. Reg. 6625, 6625
(Dec. 19, 1941). In addition, the United States systematically listened surreptitiously to
electronic communications as part of the war effort. See Dash, Eavesdroppers at 30.
During World War II, signals intelligence assisted in, among other things, the
destruction of the German U-boat fleet by the Allied naval forces, see id. at 27, and the
war against Japan, see O'Toole, supra, at 32, 323-24. In general, signals intelligence
"helped to shorten the war by perhaps two years, reduce the loss of life, and make
inevitable an eventual Allied victory." Carl Boyd, American Command of the Sea
Through Carriers, Codes, and the Silent Service: World War H and Beyond 27 (1995);
see also Alvarez, supra, at 1 ("There can be little doubt that signals intelligence
contributed significantly to the military defeat of the Axis."). Significantly, not only
was wiretapping in World War II used "extensively by military intelligence and secret
service personnel in combat areas abroad," but also "by the FBI and secret service in
this country." Dash, supra, at 30.
In light of the long history of prior wartime practice, the NSA activities fit squarely
within the sweeping terms of the AUMF. The use of signals intelligence to identify and
pinpoint the enemy is a traditional component of wartime military operations-or, to
use the terminology of Hamdi, a "fundamental and accepted.., incident to war," 542
U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion)--employed to defeat the enemy and to prevent enemy
attacks in the United States. Here, as in other conflicts, the enemy may use public
communications networks, and some of the enemy may already be in the United States.
Although those factors may be present in this conflict to a greater degree than in the
past, neither is novel. Certainly, both factors were well known at the time Congress
enacted the AUMF. Wartime interception of international communications made by the
enemy thus should be understood, no less than the wartime detention at issue in Hamdi,
as one of the basic methods of engaging and defeating the enemy that Congress
authorized in approving "all necessary and appropriate force" that the President would
need to defend the Nation. AUMF § 2(a) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the President has the authority to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance against the declared enemy of the United States in a time of armed
conflict. That authority derives from the Constitution, and is reinforced by the text and
purpose of the AUMF, the nature of the threat posed by al Qaeda that Congress
authorized the President to repel, and the long-established understanding that
electronic surveillance is a fundamental incident of the use of military force. The
President's power in authorizing the NSA activities is at its zenith because he has acted
"pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress." Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
III. THE NSA AcTIVrIEs ARE CONSISTENT wrrH THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE ACT
The President's exercise of his constitutional authority to conduct warrantless
wartime electronic surveillance of the enemy, as confirmed and supplemented by
statute in the AUMF, is fully consistent with the requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").5 FISA is a critically important tool in the War
on Terror. The United States makes full use of the authorities available under FISA to
gather foreign intelligence information, including authorities to intercept
communications, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap
and trace devices. While FISA establishes certain procedures that must be followed for
these authorities to be used (procedures that usually involve applying for and obtaining
an order from a special court), FISA also expressly contemplates that a later legislative
enactment could authorize electronic surveillance outside the procedures set forth in
FISA itself. The AUMF constitutes precisely such an enactment. To the extent there is
any ambiguity on this point, the canon of constitutional avoidance requires that such
ambiguity be resolved in favor of the President's authority to conduct the
communications intelligence activities he has described. Finally, if FISA could not be
read to allow the President to authorize the NSA activities during the current
congressionally authorized armed conflict with al Qaeda, FISA would be
unconstitutional as applied in this narrow context.
A. The Requirements of FISA
FISA was enacted in 1978 to regulate "electronic surveillance," particularly when
conducted to obtain "foreign intelligence information," as those terms are defined in
section 101 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801. As a general matter, the statute requires that
the Attorney General approve an application for an order from a special court
composed of Article III judges and created by FISA-the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC"). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1804. The application must
5. To avoid revealing details about the operation of the program, it is assumed for
purposes of this paper that the activities described by the President constitute "electronic
surveillance," as defined by FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f).
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demonstrate, among other things, that there is probable cause to believe that the target
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. See id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). It must also
contain a certification from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
or an officer of the United States appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate and having responsibilities in the area of national security or
defense that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and cannot
reasonably be obtained by normal investigative means. See id. § 1804(a)(7). FISA
further requires the Government to state the means that it proposes to use to obtain the
information and the basis for its belief that the facilities at which the surveillance will
be directed are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power. See id. § 1804(a)(4), (a)(8).
FISA was the first congressional measure that sought to impose restrictions on the
Executive Branch's authority to engage in electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes, an authority that, as noted above, had been repeatedly
recognized by the federal courts. See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires)
Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. Penn. L. Rev. 793, 810 (1989) (stating that the
"status of the President's inherent authority" to conduct surveillance "formed the core
of subsequent legislative deliberations" leading to the enactment of FISA). To that end,
FISA modified a provision in Title III that previously had disclaimed any intent to have
laws governing wiretapping interfere with the President's constitutional authority to
gather foreign intelligence. Prior to the passage of FISA, section 2511(3) of title 18
had stated that "[n]othing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934... shall limit the constitutional power of the President
to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)
(1970). FISA replaced that provision with an important, though more limited,
preservation of authority for the President. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201 (b), (c), 92
Stat. 1783, 1797 (1978), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (West Supp. 2005)
(carving out from statutory regulation only the acquisition of intelligence information
from "international or foreign communications" and "foreign intelligence activities...
involving a foreign electronic communications system" as long as they are
accomplished "utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in section
101" of FISA). Congress also defined "electronic surveillance," 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f),
carefully and somewhat narrowly.
6
6. FISA's legislative history reveals that these provisions were intended to exclude certain
intelligence activities conducted by the National Security Agency from the coverage of FISA.
According to the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on FISA, "this provision [referencing
what became the first part of section 2511(2)(0] is designed to make clear that the legislation
does not deal with international signals intelligence activities as currently engaged in by the
National Security Agency and electronic surveillance conducted outside the United States." S.
Rep. No. 95-604, at 64 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3965. The legislative
history also makes clear that the definition of "electronic surveillance" was crafted for the same
reason. See id. at 33-34, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3934-36. FISA thereby "adopts the view
expressed by the Attorney General during the hearings that enacting statutory controls to
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In addition, Congress addressed, to some degree, the manner in which FISA might
apply after a formal declaration of war by expressly allowing warrantless surveillance
for a period of fifteen days following such a declaration. Section 111 of FISA allows
the President to "authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this
subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen
calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress." 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
The legislative history of FISA shows that Congress understood it was legislating on
fragile constitutional ground and was pressing or even exceeding constitutional limits
in regulating the President's authority in the field of foreign intelligence. The final
House Conference Report, for example, recognized that the statute's restrictions might
well impermissibly infringe on the President's constitutional powers. That report
includes the extraordinary acknowledgment that "[t]he conferees agree that the
establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the President may conduct
electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court."
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048,4064. But,
invoking Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure case, the Conference
Report explained that Congress intended in FISA to exert whatever power Congress
constitutionally had over the subject matter to restrict foreign intelligence surveillance
and to leave the President solely with whatever inherent constitutional authority he
might be able to invoke against Congress's express wishes. Id. The Report thus
explains that "[tihe intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: 'When a President takes
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at the
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional power minus any
constitutional power of Congress over the matter."' Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also S.
Rep. No. 95-604, at 64, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3966 (same); see generally
Elizabeth B. Bazen et al., Congressional Research Service, Re: PresidentialAuthority
to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence
Information 28-29 (Jan. 5, 2006). It is significant, however, that Congress did not
decide conclusively to continue to push the boundaries of its constitutional authority in
wartime. Instead, Congress reserved the question of the appropriate procedures to
regulate electronic surveillance in time of war, and established a fifteen-day period
during which the President would be permitted to engage in electronic surveillance
regulate the National Security Agency and the surveillance of Americans abroad raises problems
best left to separate legislation." Id. at 64, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3965. Such legislation placing
limitations on traditional NSA activities was drafted, but never passed. See National Intelligence
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 999-1007 (1978) (text of unenacted legislation). And
Congress understood that the NSA surveillance that it intended categorically to exclude from
FISA could include the monitoring of international communications into or out of the United
States of U.S. citizens. The report specifically referred to the Church Committee report for its
description of the NSA's activities, S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 64 n.63, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3965-
66 n.63, which stated that "the NSA intercepts messages passing over international lines of
communication, some of which have one terminal within the United States. Traveling over these
lines of communication, especially those with one terminal in the United States, are messages of
Americans ...." S. Rep. 94-755, at Book II, 308 (1976). Congress's understanding in the
legislative history of FISA that such communications could be intercepted outside FISA
procedures is notable.
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without complying with FISA's express procedures and during which Congress would
have the opportunity to revisit the issue. See 50 U.S.C. § 1811; H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
95-1720, at 34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063 (noting that the purpose of the
fifteen-day period following a declaration of war in section 111 of FISA was to "allow
time for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a
wartime emergency").
B. FISA Contemplates and Allows Surveillance Authorized "By Statute"
Congress did not attempt through FISA to prohibit the Executive Branch from using
electronic surveillance. Instead, Congress acted to bring the exercise of that power
under more stringent congressional control. See, e.g., H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at
32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048,4064. Congress therefore enacted a regime
intended to supplant the President's reliance on his own constitutional authority.
Consistent with this overriding purpose of bringing the use of electronic surveillance
under congressional control and with the commonsense notion that the Congress that
enacted FISA could not bind future Congresses, FISA expressly contemplates that the
Executive Branch may conduct electronic surveillance outside FISA's express
procedures if and when a subsequent statute authorizes such surveillance.
Thus, section 109 of FISA prohibits any person from intentionally "engag[ing] ...
in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute." 50
U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (emphasis added). Because FISA's prohibitory provision broadly
exempts surveillance "authorized by statute," the provision demonstrates that Congress
did not attempt to regulate through FISA electronic surveillance authorized by
Congress through a subsequent enactment. The use of the term "statute" here is
significant because it strongly suggests that any subsequent authorizing statute, not
merely one that amends FISA itself, could legitimately authorize surveillance outside
FISA's standard procedural requirements. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) ("Except as
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-(a) intentionally
intercepts.., any wire, oral, or electronic communication[] ... shall be punished...
.") (emphasis added); id. § 251 1(2)(e) (providing a defense to liability to individuals
"conduct[ing] electronic surveillance.... as authorized by that Act [FISA]") (emphasis
added). In enacting FISA, therefore, Congress contemplated the possibility that the
President might be permitted to conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to a later-
enacted statute that did not incorporate all of the procedural requirements set forth in
FISA or that did not expressly amend FISA itself.
To be sure, the scope of this exception is rendered less clear by the conforming
amendments that FISA made to chapter 119 of title 18-the portion of the criminal
code that provides the mechanism for obtaining wiretaps for law enforcement
purposes. Before FISA was enacted, chapter 119 made it a criminal offense for any
person to intercept a communication except as specifically provided in that chapter.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (l)(a), (4)(a). Section 201(b) of FISA amended that chapter to
provide an exception from criminal liability for activities conducted pursuant to FISA.
Specifically, FISA added 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(e), which provides that it is not unlawful
for "an officer, employee, or agent of the United States... to conduct electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, as authorized by that Act." Id. § 2511(2)(e). Similarly, section 201(b) of FISA
amended chapter 119 to provide that "procedures in this chapter [or chapter 121
(addressing access to stored wire and electronic communications and customer
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records)] and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive
means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the
interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted."
Id. § 2511(2)(f) (West Supp. 2005). 7
The amendments that section 201(b) of FISA made to title 18 are fully consistent,
however, with the conclusion that FISA contemplates that a subsequent statute could
authorize electronic surveillance outside FISA's express procedural requirements.
Section 251 1(2)(e) of title 18, which provides that it is "not unlawful" for an officer of
the United States to conduct electronic surveillance "as authorized by" FISA, is best
understood as a safe-harbor provision. Because of section 109, the protection offered
by section 2511 (2)(e) for surveillance "authorized by" FISA extends to surveillance
that is authorized by any other statute and therefore excepted from the prohibition of
section 109. In any event, the purpose of section 2511 (2)(e) is merely to make explicit
what would already have been implicit-that those authorized by statute to engage in
particular surveillance do not act unlawfully when they conduct such surveillance.
Thus, even if that provision had not been enacted, an officer conducting surveillance
authorized by statute (whether FISA or some other law) could not reasonably have
been thought to be violating Title III. Similarly, section 2511 (2)(e) cannot be read to
require a result that would be manifestly unreasonable--exposing a federal officer to
criminal liability for engaging in surveillance authorized by statute, merely because the
authorizing statute happens not to be FISA itself.
Nor could 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(f), which provides that the "procedures in this
chapter . . . and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the
exclusive means by which electronic surveillance... may be conducted," have been
intended to trump the commonsense approach of section 109 and preclude a
subsequent Congress from authorizing the President to engage in electronic
surveillance through a statute other than FISA, using procedures other than those
outlined in FISA or chapter 119 of title 18. The legislative history of section 2511 (2)(f)
clearly indicates an intent to prevent the President from engaging in surveillance except
as authorized by Congress, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 32, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4064, which explains why section 2511(2)(f) set forth all then-
existing statutory restrictions on electronic surveillance. Section 251 1(2)(f)'s reference
to "exclusive means" reflected the state of statutory authority for electronic
surveillance in 1978 and cautioned the President not to engage in electronic
surveillance outside congressionally sanctioned parameters. It is implausible to think
that, in attempting to limit the President's authority, Congress also limited its own
future authority by barring subsequent Congresses from authorizing the Executive to
engage in surveillance in ways not specifically enumerated in FISA or chapter 119, or
by requiring a subsequent Congress specifically to amend FISA and section 2511(2)(f).
There would be a serious question as to whether the Ninety-Fifth Congress could have
so tied the hands of its successors. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
135 (1810) (noting that "one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding
legislature"); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) ("[T]he will of a
particular Congress... does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding
7. The bracketed portion was added in 1986 amendments to section 2511(2)(f). See Pub.
L. No. 99-508 § 101(b)(3), 100 Stat. 1848, 1850.
1394 [Vol. 81:1355
NSA DOMESTIC SPYING PROGRAM
years"); Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 703 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(collecting precedent); 1 W, Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 90
(1765) ("Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind
not"). In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary, it cannot be presumed that
Congress attempted to abnegate its own authority in such a way.
Far from a clear statement of congressional intent to bind itself, there are indications
that section 2511(2)(f) cannot be interpreted as requiring that all electronic
surveillance and domestic interception be conducted under FISA's enumerated
procedures or those of chapter 119 of title 18 until and unless those provisions are
repealed or amended. Even when section 2511 (2)(f) was enacted (and no subsequent
authorizing statute existed), it could not reasonably be read to preclude all electronic
surveillance conducted outside the procedures of FISA or chapter 119 of title 18. In
1978, use of a pen register or trap and trace device constituted electronic surveillance
as defined by FISA. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f), (n). Title I of FISA provided
procedures for obtaining court authorization for the use of pen registers to obtain
foreign intelligence information. But the Supreme Court had, just prior to the
enactment of FISA, held that chapter 119 of title 18 did not govern the use of pen
registers. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1977). Thus,
if section 2511 (2)(t) were to be read to permit of no exceptions, the use of pen registers
for purposes other than to collect foreign intelligence information would have been
unlawful because such use would not have been authorized by the "exclusive"
procedures of section 2511(2)(f), i.e., FISA and chapter 119. But no court has held that
pen registers could not be authorized outside the foreign intelligence context. Indeed,
FISA appears to have recognized this issue by providing a defense to liability for any
official who engages in electronic surveillance under a search warrant or court order.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1809(b). (The practice when FISA was enacted was for law
enforcement officers to obtain search warrants under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizing the installation and use of pen registers. See S. 1667, A Bill to
Amend Title 18, United States Code, with Respect to the Interception of Certain
Communications, Other Forms of Surveillance, and for Other Purposes: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 57 (1985) (prepared statement of James Knapp, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division)).8
In addition, section 2511 (2)(a)(ii) authorizes telecommunications providers to assist
officers of the Government engaged in electronic surveillance when the Attorney
General certifies that "no warrant or court order is required by law [and] that all
statutory requirements have been met." 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(ii). 9 If the Attorney
8. Alternatively, section 109(b) may be read to constitute a "procedure" in FISA or to
incorporate procedures from sources other than FISA (such as the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or state court procedures), and in that way to satisfy section 251 l(2)(f). But if section
109(b)'s defense can be so read, section 109(a) should also be read to constitute a procedure or
incorporate procedures not expressly enumerated in FISA.
9. Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) states:
Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication
service.... are authorized by law to provide information, facilities, or technical
assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept... communications or to
conduct electronic surveillance, as defined [by FISA], if such provider. . . has
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General can certify, in good faith, that the requirements of a subsequent statute
authorizing electronic surveillance are met, service providers are affirmatively and
expressly authorized to assist the Government. Although FISA does allow the
Government to proceed without a court order in several situations, see 50 U.S.C. §
1805(f) (emergencies); id. § 1802 (certain communications between foreign
governments), this provision specifically lists only Title III's emergency provision but
speaks generally to Attorney General certification. That reference to Attorney General
certification is consistent with the historical practice in which Presidents have
delegated to the Attorney General authority to approve warrantless surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court,
444 F.2d 651, 669-71 (6th Cir. 1971) (reproducing as an appendix memoranda from
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson). Section 2511 (2)(a)(ii) thus suggests that
telecommunications providers can be authorized to assist with warrantless electronic
surveillance when such surveillance is authorized by law outside FISA.
In sum, by expressly and broadly excepting from its prohibition electronic
surveillance undertaken "as authorized by statute," section 109 of FISA permits an
exception to the "procedures" of FISA referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(f) where
authorized by another statute, even if the other authorizing statute does not specifically
amend section 2511(2)(f).
C. The A UMF Is a "Statute" Authorizing Surveillance Outside the Confines of
FISA
The AUMF qualifies as a "statute" authorizing electronic surveillance within the
meaning of section 109 of FISA.
First, because the term "statute" historically has been given broad meaning, the
phrase "authorized by statute" in section 109 of FISA must be read to include joint
resolutions such as the AUMF. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S.
582, 592-93 (1946) (finding the term "statute" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 380 to mean "a
compendious summary of various enactments, by whatever method they may be
adopted, to which a State gives her sanction"); Black's Law Dictionary 1410 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "statute" broadly to include any "formal written enactment of a
legislative body," and stating that the term is used "to designate the legislatively
created laws in contradistinction to court decided or unwritten laws"). It is thus of no
significance to this analysis that the AUMF was enacted as a joint resolution rather
than a bill. See, e.g., Ann Arbor R.R. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658, 666 (1930)
(joint resolutions are to be construed by applying "the rules applicable to legislation in
general"); United States ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U.S. 470, 475 (1889) (joint
resolution had "all the characteristics and effects" of statute that it suspended); Padilla
ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 598 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (in analyzing the
AUMF, finding that there is "no relevant constitutional difference between a bill and a
joint resolution"), rev 'd sub nom. on other grounds, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 352 F.3d 695
(2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Letter for the Hon. John Conyers,
Jr., U.S. House of Representatives, from Prof. Laurence H. Tribe at 3 (Jan. 6, 2006)
been provided with ... a certification in writing by [specified persons proceeding
under Title III's emergency provision] or the Attorney General of the United
States that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory
requirements have been met, and that the specific assistance is required.
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(term "statute" in section 109 of FISA "of course encompasses a joint resolution
presented to and signed by the President").
Second, the longstanding history of communications intelligence as a fundamental
incident of the use of force and the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
strongly suggest that the AUMF satisfies the requirement of section 109 of FISA for
statutory authorization of electronic surveillance. As explained above, it is not
necessary to demarcate the outer limits of the AUMF to conclude that it encompasses
electronic surveillance targeted at the enemy. Just as a majority of the Court concluded
in Hamdi that the AUMF authorizes detention of U.S. citizens who are enemy
combatants without expressly mentioning the President's long-recognized power to
detain, so too does it authorize the use of electronic surveillance without specifically
mentioning the President's equally long-recognized power to engage in
communications intelligence targeted at the enemy. And just as the AUMF satisfies the
requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) that no U.S. citizen be detained "except pursuant to
an Act of Congress," so too does it satisfy section 109's requirement for statutory
authorization of electronic surveillance.' 0 In authorizing the President's use of force in
response to the September 11 th attacks, Congress did not need to comb through the
United States Code looking for those restrictions that it had placed on national security
operations during times of peace and designate with specificity each traditional tool of
military force that it sought to authorize the President to use. There is no historical
precedent for such a requirement: authorizations to use military force traditionally have
been couched in general language. Indeed, prior administrations have interpreted joint
resolutions declaring war and authorizing the use of military force to authorize
expansive collection of communications into and out of the United States."
Moreover, crucial to the Framers' decision to vest the President with primary
constitutional authority to defend the Nation from foreign attack is the fact that the
Executive can act quickly, decisively, and flexibly as needed. For Congress to have a
10. It might be argued that Congress dealt more comprehensively with electronic
surveillance in FISA than it did with detention in 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). Thus, although Congress
prohibited detention "except pursuant to an Act of Congress," it combined the analogous
prohibition in FISA (section 109(a)) with section 2511 (2)(f)'s exclusivity provision. See Letter
to the Hon. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from Professor Curtis A. Bradley et al. at 5
n.6 (Jan. 9, 2006) (noting that section 4001(a) does not "attempt[] to create an exclusive
mechanism for detention"). On closer examination, however, it is evident that Congress has
regulated detention far more meticulously than these arguments suggest. Detention is the topic
of much of the Criminal Code, as well as a variety of other statutes, including those providing
for civil commitment of the mentally ill and confinement of alien terrorists. The existence of
these statutes and accompanying extensive procedural safeguards, combined with the substantial
constitutional issues inherent in detention, see, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574-75 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), refute any such argument.
11. As noted above, in intercepting communications, President Wilson relied on his
constitutional authority and the joint resolution declaring war and authorizing the use of military
force, which, as relevant here, provided "that the President [is] authorized and directed to
employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the
Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict
to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the
Congress of the United States." Joint Resolution of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1. The
authorization did not explicitly mention interception of communications.
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role in that process, it must be able to act with similar speed, either to lend its support
to, or to signal its disagreement with, proposed military action. Yet the need for prompt
decisionmaking in the wake of a devastating attack on the United States is
fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that to do so Congress must legislate at a
level of detail more in keeping with a peacetime budget reconciliation bill. In
emergency situations, Congress must be able to use broad language that effectively
sanctions the President's use of the core incidents of military force. That is precisely
what Congress did when it passed the AUMF on September 14, 2001-just three days
after the deadly attacks on America. The Capitol had been evacuated on September
11 th, and Congress was meeting in scattered locations. As an account emerged of who
might be responsible for these attacks, Congress acted quickly to authorize the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against the enemy that he
determines was involved in the September 11 th attacks. Under these circumstances, it
would be unreasonable and wholly impractical to demand that Congress specifically
amend FISA in order to assist the President in defending the Nation. Such specificity
would also have been self-defeating because it would have apprised our adversaries of
some of our most sensitive methods of intelligence gathering.'
2
Section 111 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811, which authorizes the President,
"[n]otwithstanding any other law," to conduct "electronic surveillance without a court
order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not
to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress," does not
require a different reading of the AUMF. See also id. § 1844 (same provision for pen
registers); id. § 1829 (same provision for physical searches). Section 111 cannot
reasonably be read as Congress's final word on electronic surveillance during wartime,
thus permanently limiting the President in all circumstances to a mere fifteen days of
warrantless military intelligence gathering targeted at the enemy following a
declaration of war. Rather, section 111 represents Congress's recognition that it would
likely have to return to the subject and provide additional authorization to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance outside FISA during time of war. The Conference
Report explicitly stated the conferees' "inten[t] that this [fifteen-day] period will allow
time for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a
wartime emergency." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 34, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063. Congress enacted section 111 so that the President could
conduct warrantless surveillance while Congress considered supplemental wartime
legislation.
Nothing in the terms of section 111 disables Congress from authorizing such
electronic surveillance as a traditional incident of war through a broad, conflict-
12. Some have suggested that the Administration declined to seek a specific amendment to
FISA allowing the NSA activities "because it was advised that Congress would reject such an
amendment," Letter to the Hon. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from Professor Curtis
A. Bradley et al. 4 & n.4 (Jan. 9, 2005), and they have quoted in support of that assertion the
Attorney General's statement that certain Members of Congress advised the Administration that
legislative relief "would be difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 4 n.4. As the Attorney General
subsequently indicated, however, the difficulty with such specific legislation was that it could
not be enacted "without compromising the program." See Remarks by Homeland Security
Secretary Chertoff and Attorney General Gonzales on the USA PATRIOT Act (Dec. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ display?content=5285.
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specific authorization for the use of military force, such as the AUMF. Although the
legislative history of section 111 indicates that in 1978 some Members of Congress
believed that any such authorization would come in the form of a particularized
amendment to FISA itself, section 111 does not require that result. Nor could the
Ninety-Fifth Congress tie the hands of a subsequent Congress in this way, at least in the
absence of far clearer statutory language expressly requiring that result. See supra, pp.
21-22; compare, e.g., War Powers Resolution, § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) ("Authority to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... shall not be inferred... from
any provision of law . . . unless such provision specifically authorizes [such]
introduction . . . and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this chapter."); 10 U.S.C. § 401 (stating that any
other provision of law providing assistance to foreign countries to detect and clear
landmines shall be subject to specific limitations and may be construed as superseding
such limitations "only if, and to the extent that, such provision specifically refers to this
section and specifically identifies the provision of this section that is to be considered
superseded or otherwise inapplicable"). An interpretation of section 111 that would
disable Congress from authorizing broader electronic surveillance in that form can be
reconciled neither with the purposes of section 111 nor with the well-established
proposition that "one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding
legislature." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135; see supra Part H.B. For these
reasons, the better interpretation is that section 111 was not intended to, and did not,
foreclose Congress from using the AUMF as the legal vehicle for supplementing the
President's existing authority under FISA in the battle against al Qaeda.
The contrary interpretation of section 11 also ignores the important differences
between a formal declaration of war and a resolution such as the AUMF. As a
historical matter, a formal declaration of war was no longer than a sentence, and thus
Congress would not expect a declaration of war to outline the extent to which Congress
authorized the President to engage in various incidents of waging war. Authorizations
for the use of military force, by contrast, are typically more detailed and are made for
the specific purpose of reciting the manner in which Congress has authorized the
President to act. Thus, Congress could reasonably expect that an authorization for the
use of military force would address the issue of wartime surveillance, while a
declaration of war would not. Here, the AUMF declares that the Nation faces "an
unusual and extraordinary threat," acknowledges that "the President has authority
under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism
against the United States," and provides that the President is authorized "to use all
necessary and appropriate force" against those "he determines" are linked to the
September 1 lth attacks. AUMF pmbl., § 2. This sweeping language goes far beyond
the bare terms of a declaration of war. Compare, e.g., Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30
Stat. 364 ("First. That war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist. . . between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.").
Although legislation that has included a declaration of war has often also included
an authorization of the President to use force, these provisions are separate and need
not be combined in a single statute. See, e.g., id. ("Second. That the President of the
United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States
the militia of the several states, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this Act
into effect.") (emphasis added). Moreover, declarations of war have legal significance
independent of any additional authorization of force that might follow. See, e.g., Louis
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Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 75 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that a
formal state of war has various legal effects, such as terminating diplomatic relations,
and abrogating or suspending treaty obligations and international law rights and
duties); see also id. at 370 n.65 (speculating that one reason to fight an undeclared war
would be to "avoid the traditional consequences of declared war on relations with third
nations or even. . . belligerents").
In addition, section 111 does not cover the vast majority of modem military
conflicts. The last declared war was World War II. Indeed, the most recent conflict
prior to the passage of FISA, Vietnam, was fought without a formal declaration of war.
In addition, the War Powers Resolution, enacted less than five years before FISA,
clearly recognizes the distinctions between formal declarations of war and
authorizations of force and demonstrates that, if Congress had wanted to include such
authorizations in section 111, it knew how to do so. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)
(attempting to impose certain consequences 60 days after reporting the initiation of
hostilities to Congress "unless the Congress ... has declared war or has enacted a
specific authorization for such use" of military force) (emphasis added). It is possible
that, in enacting section 111, Congress intended to make no provision for even the
temporary use of electronic surveillance without a court order for what had become the
legal regime for most military conflicts. A better reading, however, is that Congress
assumed that such a default provision would be unnecessary because, if it had acted
through an authorization for the use of military force, the more detailed provisions of
that authorization would resolve the extent to which Congress would attempt to
authorize, or withhold authorization for, the use of electronic surveillance.'
3
13. Some have pointed to the specific amendments to FISA that Congress made shortly
after September 1lth in the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 204, 218, 115 Stat.
272, 281, 291 (2001), to argue that Congress did not contemplate electronic surveillance outside
the parameters of FISA. See Memorandum for Members of the House Permanent Select Comm.
on Intel. from Jeffrey H. Smith, Re: Legal Authorities Regarding Warrantless Surveillance of
U.S. Persons 6-7 (Jan. 3, 2006). The USA PATRIOT Act amendments, however, do not justify
giving the AUMF an unnaturally narrow reading. The USA PATRIOT Act amendments made
important corrections in the general application of FISA; they were not intended to define the
precise incidents of military force that would be available to the President in prosecuting the
current armed conflict against al Qaeda and its allies. Many removed long-standing impediments
to the effectiveness of FISA that had contributed to the maintenance of an unnecessary "wall"
between foreign intelligence gathering and criminal law enforcement; others were technical
clarifications. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,725-30 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
The "wall" had been identified as a significant problem hampering the Government's efficient
use of foreign intelligence information well before the September 11 th attacks and in contexts
unrelated to terrorism. See, e.g., Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the
Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation 710, 729, 732 (May 2000);
General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on
Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited (GAO-01-780) 3, 31 (July 2001). Finally, it is
worth noting that Justice Souter made a similar argument in Hamdi that the USA PATRIOT Act
all but compelled a narrow reading of the AUMF. See 542 U.S. at 551 ("It is very difficult to
believe that the same Congress that carefully circumscribed Executive power over alien
terrorists on home soil [in the USA PATRIOT Act] would not have meant to require the
Government to justify clearly its detention of an American citizen held on home soil
incommunicado."). Only Justice Ginsburg joined this opinion, and the position was rejected by
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The broad text of the AUMF, the authoritative interpretation that the Supreme Court
gave it in Hamdi, and the circumstances in which it was passed demonstrate that the
AUMF is a statute authorizing electronic surveillance under section 109 of FISA.
When the President authorizes electronic surveillance against the enemy pursuant to
the AUMF, he is therefore acting at the height of his authority under Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
D.The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance Requires Resolving in Favor of the
President's Authority Any Ambiguity About Whether FISA Forbids the NSA
Activities
As explained above, the AUMF fully authorizes the NSA activities. Because FISA
contemplates the possibility that subsequent statutes could authorize electronic
surveillance without requiring FISA's standard procedures, the NSA activities are also
consistent with FISA and related provisions in title 18. Nevertheless, some might argue
that sections 109 and 111 of FISA, along with section 2511(2)(f)'s "exclusivity"
provision and section 2511(2)(e)'s liability exception for officers engaged in FISA-
authorized surveillance, are best read to suggest that FISA requires that subsequent
authorizing legislation specifically amend FISA in order to free the Executive from
FISA's enumerated procedures. As detailed above, this is not the better reading of
FISA. But even if these provisions were ambiguous, any doubt as to whether the
AUMF and FISA should be understood to allow the President to make tactical military
decisions to authorize surveillance outside the parameters of FISA must be resolved to
avoid the serious constitutional questions that a contrary interpretation would raise.
It is well established that the first task of any interpreter faced with a statute that
may present an unconstitutional infringement on the powers of the President is to
determine whether the statute may be construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty.
"[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is 'fairly
possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems." INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (citations omitted); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Moreover, the canon of constitutional
avoidance has particular importance in the realm of national security, where the
President's constitutional authority is at its highest. See Department of the Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 530 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation 325 (1994) (describing "[s]uper-strong rule against congressional
interference with the President's authority over foreign affairs and national security").
Thus, courts and the Executive Branch typically construe a general statute, even one
a majority of Justices.
Nor do later amendments to FISA undermine the conclusion that the AUMF authorizes
electronic surveillance outside the procedures of FISA. Three months after the enactment of the
AUMF, Congress enacted certain "technical amendments" to FISA which, inter alia, extended
the time during which the Attorney General may issue an emergency authorization of electronic
surveillance from 24 to 72 hours. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-108, § 314, 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001). These modifications to FISA do not in any
way undermine Congress's previous authorization in the AUMF for the President to engage in
electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA in the specific context of the armed
conflict with al Qaeda.
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that is written in unqualified terms, to be implicitly limited so as not to infringe on the
President's Commander in Chief powers.
Reading FISA to prohibit the NSA activities would raise two serious constitutional
questions, both of which must be avoided if possible: (1) whether the signals
intelligence collection the President determined was necessary to undertake is such a
core exercise of Commander in Chief control over the Armed Forces during armed
conflict that Congress cannot interfere with it at all and (2) whether the particular
restrictions imposed by FISA are such that their application would impermissibly
impede the President's exercise of his constitutionally assigned duties as Commander
in Chief. Constitutional avoidance principles require interpreting FISA, at least in the
context of the military conflict authorized by the AUMF, to avoid these questions, if
"fairly possible." Even if Congress intended FISA to use the full extent of its
constitutional authority to "occupy the field" of "electronic surveillance," as FISA used
that term, during peacetime, the legislative history indicates that Congress had not
reached a definitive conclusion about its regulation during wartime. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 95-1720, at 34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063 (noting that the
purpose of the fifteen-day period following a declaration of war in section 111 of FISA
was to "allow time for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be
appropriate during a wartime emergency"). Therefore, it is not clear that Congress, in
fact, intended to test the limits of its constitutional authority in the context of wartime
electronic surveillance.
Whether Congress may interfere with the President's constitutional authority to
collect foreign intelligence information through interception of communications
reasonably believed to be linked to the enemy poses a difficult constitutional question.
As explained in Part I, it had long been accepted at the time of FISA's enactment that
the President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Congress recognized at the time that the
enactment of a statute purporting to eliminate the President's ability, even during
peacetime, to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence
was near or perhaps beyond the limit of Congress's Article I powers. The NSA
activities, however, involve signals intelligence performed in the midst of a
congressionally authorized armed conflict undertaken to prevent further hostile attacks
on the United States. The NSA activities lie at the very core of the Commander in
Chief power, especially in light of the AUMF's explicit authorization for the President
to take all necessary and appropriate military action to stop al Qaeda from striking
again. The constitutional principles at stake here thus involve not merely the
President's well-established inherent authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes during peacetime, but also the powers and duties
expressly conferred on him as Commander in Chief by Article II.
Even outside the context of wartime surveillance of the enemy, the source and scope
of Congress's power to restrict the President's inherent authority to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance is unclear. As explained above, the President's role as sole
organ for the Nation in foreign affairs has long been recognized as carrying with it
preeminent authority in the field of national security and foreign intelligence. The
source of this authority traces to the Vesting Clause of Article II, which states that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. The Vesting Clause "has long been held to confer on the
President plenary authority to represent the United States and to pursue its interests
outside the borders of the country, subject only to limits specifically set forth in the
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Constitution itself and to such statutory limitations as the Constitution permits
Congress to impose by exercising one of its enumerated powers." The President's
Compliance with the "Timely Notification" Requirement of Section 501(b) of the
National Security Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 159, 160-61 (1986) ("Timely Notification
Requirement Op.").
Moreover, it is clear that some presidential authorities in this context are beyond
Congress's ability to regulate. For example, as the Supreme Court explained in Curtiss-
Wright, the President "makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it." 299 U.S. at 319. Similarly, President Washington
established early in the history of the Republic the Executive's absolute authority to
maintain the secrecy of negotiations with foreign powers, even against congressional
efforts to secure information. See id. at 320-21. Recognizing presidential authority in
this field, the Executive Branch has taken the position that "congressional legislation
authorizing extraterritorial diplomatic and intelligence activities is superfluous, and...
statutes infringing the President's inherent Article II authority would be
unconstitutional." Timely Notification Requirement Op., 10 Op. O.L.C. at 164.
There are certainly constitutional limits on Congress's ability to interfere with the
President's power to conduct foreign intelligence searches, consistent with the
Constitution, within the United States. As explained above, intelligence gathering is at
the heart of executive functions. Since the time of the Founding it has been recognized
that matters requiring secrecy-and intelligence in particular-are quintessentially
executive functions. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 64, at 435 (John Jay) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed. 1961) ("The convention have done well therefore in so disposing of the
power of making treaties, that although the president must in forming them act by the
advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest."); see also Timely Notification
Requirement Op., 10 Op. O.L.C. at 165; cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713,729-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]t is the constitutional duty of the
Executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the
courts know law-through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations,
to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the field of
international relations and national defense.").
Because Congress has rarely attempted to intrude in this area and because many of
these questions are not susceptible to judicial review, there are few guideposts for
determining exactly where the line defining the President's sphere of exclusive
authority lies. Typically, if a statute is in danger of encroaching upon exclusive powers
of the President, the courts apply the constitutional avoidance canon, if a construction
avoiding the constitutional issue is "fairly possible." See, e.g., Egan, 484 U.S. at 527,
530. The only court that squarely has addressed the relative powers of Congress and
the President in this field suggested that the balance tips decidedly in the President's
favor. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review recently noted that all
courts to have addressed the issue of the President's inherent authority have "held that
the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to obtain
foreign intelligence information." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,742 (Foreign Intel.
Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002). On the basis of that unbroken line of precedent, the court
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"[took] for granted that the President does have that authority," and concluded that,
"assuming that is so, FISA could not encroach on the President's constitutional
power." Id.14 Although the court did not provide extensive analysis, it is the only
judicial statement on point, and it comes from the specialized appellate court created
expressly to deal with foreign intelligence issues under FISA.
But the NSA activities are not simply exercises of the President's general foreign
affairs powers. Rather, they are primarily an exercise of the President's authority as
Commander in Chief during an armed conflict that Congress expressly has authorized
the President to pursue. The NSA activities, moreover, have been undertaken
specifically to prevent a renewed attack at the hands of an enemy that has already
inflicted the single deadliest foreign attack in the Nation's history. The core of the
Commander in Chief power is the authority to direct the Armed Forces in conducting a
military campaign. Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that the "President alone"
is "constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations." Hamilton v.
Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874); The Federalist No. 74, at 500 (Alexander
Hamilton). "As commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and
subdue the enemy." Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). As Chief
Justice Chase explained in 1866, although Congress has authority to legislate to
support the prosecution of a war, Congress may not "interfere[] with the command of
the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President
as commander-in-chief." Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase,
C.J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
The Executive Branch uniformly has construed the Commander in Chief and
foreign affairs powers to grant the President authority that is beyond the ability of
Congress to regulate. In 1860, Attorney General Black concluded that an act of
Congress, if intended to constrain the President's discretion in assigning duties to an
officer in the army, would be unconstitutional:
As commander-in-chief of the army it is your right to decide according to your
own judgment what officer shall perform any particular duty, and as the supreme
executive magistrate you have the power of appointment. Congress could not, if it
would, take away from the President, or in anywise diminish the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution.
Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 462, 468 (1860). Attorney General
Black went on to explain that, in his view, the statute involved there could probably be
read as simply providing "a recommendation" that the President could decline to
follow at his discretion. Id. at 469-70.'5
14. In the past, other courts have declined to express a view on that issue one way or the
other. See, e.g., Butenko, 494 F.2d at 601 ("We do not intimate, at this time, any view
whatsoever as the proper resolution of the possible clash of the constitutional powers of the
President and Congress.").
15. Executive practice recognizes, consistent with the Constitution, some congressional
control over the Executive's decisions concerning the Armed Forces. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress power "to raise and support Armies"). But such examples have
1404 [Vol. 81:1355
NSA DOMESTIC SPYING PROGRAM
Supreme Court precedent does not support claims of congressional authority over
core military decisions during armed conflicts. In particular, the two decisions of the
Supreme Court that address a conflict between asserted wartime powers of the
Commander in Chief and congressional legislation and that resolve the conflict in favor
of Congress-Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), and Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)-are both distinguishable from the
situation presented by the NSA activities in the conflict with al Qaeda. Neither
supports the constitutionality of the restrictions in FISA as applied here.
Barreme involved a suit brought to recover a ship seized by an officer of the U.S.
Navy on the high seas during the so-called "Quasi War" with France in 1799. The
seizure had been based upon the officer's orders implementing an act of Congress
suspending commerce between the United States and France and authorizing the
seizure of American ships bound to a French port. The ship in question was suspected
of sailing from a French port. The Supreme Court held that the orders given by the
President could not authorize a seizure beyond the terms of the statute and therefore
that the seizure of the ship not in fact bound to a French port was unlawful. See 6 U.S.
at 177-78. Although some commentators have broadly characterized Barreme as
standing for the proposition that Congress may restrict by statute the means by which
the President can direct the Nation's Armed Forces to carry on a war, the Court's
holding was limited in at least two significant ways. First, the operative section of the
statute in question applied only to American merchant ships. See id. at 170 (quoting
Act of February 9, 1799). Thus, the Court simply had no occasion to rule on whether,
even in the limited and peculiar circumstances of the Quasi War, Congress could have
not involved congressional attempts to regulate the actual conduct of a military campaign, and
there is no comparable textual support for such interference. For example, just before World
War H, Attorney General Robert Jackson concluded that the Neutrality Act prohibited President
Roosevelt from selling certain armed naval vessels and sending them to Great Britain. See
Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att'y Gen.
484, 496 (1940). Jackson's apparent conclusion that Congress could control the President's
ability to transfer war material does not imply acceptance of direct congressional regulation of
the Commander in Chief's control of the means and methods of engaging the enemy in conflict.
Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Truman Administration readily
conceded that, if Congress had prohibited the seizure of steel mills by statute, Congress's action
would have been controlling. See Brief for Petitioner at 150, Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(Nos. 744 and 745). This concession implies nothing concerning congressional control over the
methods of engaging the enemy.
Likewise, the fact that the Executive Branch has, at times, sought congressional ratification
after taking unilateral action in a wartime emergency does not reflect a concession that the
Executive lacks authority in this area. A decision to seek congressional support can be prompted
by many motivations, including a desire for political support. In modern times, several
administrations have sought congressional authorization for the use of military force while
preserving the ability to assert the unconstitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. See, e.g.,
Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 1 Pub.
Papers of George Bush 40 (1991) ("[M]y request for congressional support did not ...
constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the
President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."). Moreover, many actions for which
congressional support has been sought-such as President Lincoln's action in raising an Army
in 1861--quite likely fall primarily under Congress's core Article I powers.
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placed some restriction on the orders the Commander in Chief could issue concerning
direct engagements with enemy forces. Second, it is significant that the statute in
Barreme was cast expressly, not as a limitation on the conduct of warfare by the
President, but rather as regulation of a subject within the core of Congress's
enumerated powers under Article I-the regulation of foreign commerce. See U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The basis of Congress's authority to act was therefore clearer in
Barreme than it is here.
Youngstown involved an effort by the President-in the face of a threatened work
stoppage-to seize and to run steel mills. Congress had expressly considered the
possibility of giving the President power to effect such a seizure during national
emergencies. It rejected that option, however, instead providing different mechanisms
for resolving labor disputes and mechanisms for seizing industries to ensure production
vital to national defense.
For the Court, the connection between the seizure and the core Commander in Chief
function of commanding the Armed Forces was too attenuated. The Court pointed out
that the case did not involve authority over "day-to-day fighting in a theater of war."
Id. at 587. Instead, it involved a dramatic extension of the President's authority over
military operations to exercise control over an industry that was vital for producing
equipment needed overseas. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion also reveals a
concern for what might be termed foreign-to-domestic presidential bootstrapping. The
United States became involved in the Korean conflict through President Truman's
unilateral decision to commit troops to the defense of South Korea. The President then
claimed authority, based upon this foreign conflict, to extend presidential control into
vast sectors of the domestic economy. Justice Jackson expressed "alarm[]" at a theory
under which "a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled,
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of
the country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture." Id. at 642.
Moreover, President Truman's action extended the President's authority into a field
that the Constitution predominantly assigns to Congress. See id. at 588 (discussing
Congress's commerce power and noting that "[t]he Constitution does not subject this
lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control"); see
also id. at 643 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that Congress is given express
authority to "'raise and support Armies' and "'to provide and maintain a Navy"')
(quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13). Thus, Youngstown involved an assertion of
executive power that not only stretched far beyond the President's core Commander in
Chief functions, but that did so by intruding into areas where Congress had been given
an express, and apparently dominant, role by the Constitution.
1 6
The present situation differs dramatically. The exercise of executive authority
involved in the NSA activities is not several steps removed from the actual conduct of
a military campaign. As explained above, it is an essential part of the military
campaign. Unlike the activities at issue in Youngstown, the NSA activities are directed
at the enemy, and not at domestic activity that might incidentally aid the war effort.
16. Youngstown does demonstrate that the mere fact that Executive action might be placed
in Justice Jackson's category III does not obviate the need for further analysis. Justice Jackson's
framework therefore recognizes that Congress might impermissibly interfere with the
President's authority as Commander in Chief or to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs.
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And assertion of executive authority here does not involve extending presidential
power into areas reserved for Congress. Moreover, the theme that appeared most
strongly in Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown-the fear of presidential
bootstrapping--does not apply in this context. Whereas President Truman had used his
inherent constitutional authority to commit U.S. troops, here Congress expressly
provided the President sweeping authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force"
to protect the Nation from further attack. AUMF § 2(a). There is thus no bootstrapping
concern.
Finally, Youngstown cannot be read to suggest that the President's authority for
engaging the enemy is less extensive inside the United States than abroad. To the
contrary, the extent of the President's Commander in Chief authority necessarily
depends on where the enemy is found and where the battle is waged. In World War II,
for example, the Supreme Court recognized that the President's authority as
Commander in Chief, as supplemented by Congress, included the power to capture and
try agents of the enemy in the United States, even if they never had "entered the theatre
or zone of active military operations." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.17 In the present conflict,
unlike in the Korean War, the battlefield was brought to the United States in the most
literal way, and the United States continues to face a threat of further attacks on its soil.
In short, therefore, Youngstown does not support the view that Congress may
constitutionally prohibit the President from authorizing the NSA activities.
The second serious constitutional question is whether the particular restrictions
imposed by FISA would impermissibly hamper the President's exercise of his
constitutionally assigned duties as Commander in Chief. The President has determined
that the speed and agility required to carry out the NSA activities successfully could
not have been achieved under FISA."8 Because the President also has determined that
the NSA activities are necessary to the defense of the United States from a subsequent
terrorist attack in the armed conflict with al Qaeda, FISA would impermissibly
interfere with the President's most solemn constitutional obligation-to defend the
United States against foreign attack.
Indeed, if an interpretation of FISA that allows the President to conduct the NSA
activities were not "fairly possible," FISA would be unconstitutional as applied in the
context of this congressionally authorized armed conflict. In that event, FISA would
purport to prohibit the President from undertaking actions necessary to fulfill his
constitutional obligation to protect the Nation from foreign attack in the context of a
congressionally authorized armed conflict with an enemy that has already staged the
most deadly foreign attack in our Nation's history. A statute may not "impede the
17. It had been recognized long before Youngstown that, in a large-scale conflict, the area
of operations could readily extend to the continental United States, even when there are no
major engagements of armed forces here. Thus, in the context of the trial of a German officer for
spying in World War I, it was recognized that "[wlith the progress made in obtaining ways and
means for devastation and destruction, the territory of the United States was certainly within the
field of active operations" during the war, particularly in the port of New York, and that a spy in
the United States might easily have aided the "hostile operation" of U-boats off the coast.
United States ex reL Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
18. In order to avoid further compromising vital national security activities, a full
explanation of the basis for the President's determination cannot be given in an unclassified
document.
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President's ability to perform his constitutional duty," Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 691 (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. at 696-97, particularly not the
President's most solemn constitutional obligation-the defense of the Nation. See also
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742 (explaining that "FISA could not encroach on the
President's constitutional power").
Application of the avoidance canon would be especially appropriate here for several
reasons beyond the acute constitutional crises that would otherwise result. First, as
noted, Congress did not intend FISA to be the final word on electronic surveillance
conducted during armed conflicts. Instead, Congress expected that it would revisit the
subject in subsequent legislation. Whatever intent can be gleaned from FISA's text and
legislative history to set forth a comprehensive scheme for regulating electronic
surveillance during peacetime, that same intent simply does not extend to armed
conflicts and declared wars.19 Second, FISA was enacted during the Cold War, not
during active hostilities with an adversary whose mode of operation is to blend in with
the civilian population until it is ready to strike. These changed circumstances have
seriously altered the constitutional calculus, one that FISA's enactors had already
recognized might suggest that the statute was unconstitutional. Third, certain
technological changes have rendered FISA still more problematic. As discussed above,
when FISA was enacted in 1978, Congress expressly declined to regulate through
FISA certain signals intelligence activities conducted by the NSA. See supra, at pp. 18-
19 & n.6.20 These same factors weigh heavily in favor of concluding that FISA would
be unconstitutional as applied to the current conflict if the canon of constitutional
avoidance could not be used to head off a collision between the Branches.
As explained above, FISA is best interpreted to allow a statute such as the AUMF to
authorize electronic surveillance outside FISA's enumerated procedures. The strongest
counterarguments to this conclusion are that various provisions in FISA and title 18,
including section 111 of FISA and section 2511 (2)(f) of title 18, together require that
subsequent legislation must reference or amend FISA in order to authorize electronic
surveillance outside FISA's procedures and that interpreting the AUMF as a statute
authorizing electronic surveillance outside FISA procedures amounts to a disfavored
repeal by implication. At the very least, however, interpreting FISA to allow a
19. FISA exempts the President from its procedures for fifteen days following a
congressional declaration of war. See 50 U.S.C. § 1811. If an adversary succeeded in a
decapitation strike, preventing Congress from declaring war or passing subsequent authorizing
legislation, it seems clear that FISA could not constitutionally continue to apply in such
circumstances.
20. Since FISA's enactment in 1978, the means of transmitting communications has
undergone extensive transformation. In particular, many communications that would have been
carried by wire are now transmitted through the air, and many communications that would have
been carried by radio signals (including by satellite transmissions) are now transmitted by fiber
optic cables. It is such technological advancements that have broadened FISA's reach, not any
particularized congressional judgment that the NSA's traditional activities in intercepting such
international communications should be subject to FISA's procedures. A full explanation of
these technological changes would require a discussion of classified information.
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subsequent statute such as the AUMF to authorize electronic surveillance without
following FISA's express procedures is "fairly possible," and that is all that is required
for purposes of invoking constitutional avoidance. In the competition of competing
canons, particularly in the context of an ongoing armed conflict, the constitutional
avoidance canon carries much greater interpretative force.2'
IV. THE NSA AcTVrrIEs ARE CONSISTENT WrH THE FoURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" and directs
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The touchstone for review of government
action under the Fourth Amendment is whether the search is "reasonable." See, e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
21. If the text of FISA were clear that nothing other than an amendment to FISA could
authorize additional electronic surveillance, the AUMF would impliedly repeal as much of FISA
as would prevent the President from using "all necessary and appropriate force" in order to
prevent al Qaeda and its allies from launching another terrorist attack against the United States.
To be sure, repeals by implication are disfavored and are generally not found whenever two
statutes are "capable of co-existence." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018
(1984). Under this standard, an implied repeal may be found where one statute would "unduly
interfere with" the operation of another. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156
(1976). The President's determination that electronic surveillance of al Qaeda outside the
confines of FISA was "necessary and appropriate" would create a clear conflict between the
AUMF and FISA. FISA's restrictions on the use of electronic surveillance would preclude the
President from doing what the AUMF specifically authorized him to do: use all "necessary and
appropriate force" to prevent al Qaeda from carrying out future attacks against the United States.
The ordinary restrictions in FISA cannot continue to apply if the AUMF is to have its full effect;
those constraints would "unduly interfere" with the operation of the AUMF.
Contrary to the recent suggestion made by several law professors and former government
officials, the ordinary presumption against implied repeals is overcome here. Cf. Letter to the
Hon. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from Professor Curtis A. Bradley et al. at 4 (Jan.
9, 2006). First, like other canons of statutory construction, the canon against implied repeals is
simply a presumption that may be rebutted by other factors, including conflicting canons.
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992); see also Chickasaw Nation
v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115
(2001). Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to apply the ordinary presumption against
implied repeals where other canons apply and suggest the opposite result. See Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1985). Moreover, Blackfeet suggests that
where the presumption against implied repeals would conflict with other, more compelling
interpretive imperatives, it simply does not apply at all. See 471 U.S. at 766. Here, in light of the
constitutional avoidance canon, which imposes the overriding imperative to use the tools of
statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional conflicts, the implied repeal canon either would
not apply at all or would apply with significantly reduced force. Second, the AUMF was enacted
during an acute national emergency, where the type of deliberation and detail normally required
for application of the canon against implied repeals was neither practical nor warranted. As
discussed above, in these circumstances, Congress cannot be expected to work through every
potential implication of the U.S. Code and to define with particularity each of the traditional
incidents of the use of force available to the President.
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As noted above, see Part I, all of the federal courts of appeals to have addressed the
issue have affirmed the President's inherent constitutional authority to collect foreign
intelligence without a warrant. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742. Properly
understood, foreign intelligence collection in general, and the NSA activities in
particular, fit within the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the mere fact that no warrant is secured prior to the
surveillance at issue in the NSA activities does not suffice to render the activities
unreasonable. Instead, reasonableness in this context must be assessed under a general
balancing approach, "'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). The
NSA activities are reasonable because the Government's interest, defending the Nation
from another foreign attack in time of armed conflict, outweighs the individual privacy
interests at stake, and because they seek to intercept only international communications
where one party is linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
A. The Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment Does Not Apply to the NSA
Activities
In "the criminal context," the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement
"usually requires a showing of probable cause" and a warrant. Board ofEduc. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002). The requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause,
however, is not universal. Rather, the Fourth Amendment's "central requirement is one
of reasonableness," and the rules the Court has developed to implement that
requirement "[slometimes ... require warrants." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326,
330 (2001); see also, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 828 (noting that the probable cause
standard "is peculiarly related to criminal investigations and may be unsuited to
determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the Government seeks
to prevent the development of hazardous conditions") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In particular, the Supreme Court repeatedly has made clear that in situations
involving "special needs" that go beyond a routine interest in law enforcement, the
warrant requirement is inapplicable. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (there are
circumstances "'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable"') (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); see also McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330 ("When
faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal
intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual,
circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable."). It is difficult to
encapsulate in a nutshell all of the different circumstances the Court has found to
qualify as "special needs" justifying warrantless searches. But one application in which
the Court has found the warrant requirement inapplicable is in circumstances in which
the Government faces an increased need to be able to react swiftly and flexibly, or
when there are at stake interests in public safety beyond the interests in ordinary law
enforcement. One important factor in establishing "special needs" is whether the
Government is responding to an emergency that goes beyond the need for general
crime control. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 745-46.
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Thus, the Court has permitted warrantless searches of property of students in public
schools, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (noting that warrant
requirement would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools"), to screen athletes and students
involved in extracurricular activities at public schools for drug use, see Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 654-55; Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-38, to conduct drug testing of railroad personnel
involved in train accidents, see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 634 (1989), and to search probationers' homes, see Griffin, 483 U.S. 868. Many
special needs doctrine and related cases have upheld suspicionless searches or seizures.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (implicitly relying on special
needs doctrine to uphold use of automobile checkpoint to obtain information about
recent hit-and-run accident); Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-38 (suspicionless drug testing of
public school students involved in extracurricular activities); Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-55 (1990) (road block to check all motorists for signs
of drunken driving); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (road
block near the border to check vehicles for illegal immigrants); cf. In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d at 745-46 (noting that suspicionless searches and seizures in one sense are a
greater encroachment on privacy than electronic surveillance under FISA because they
are not based on any particular suspicion, but "[o]n the other hand, wiretapping is a
good deal more intrusive than an automobile stop accompanied by questioning"). To
fall within the "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement, the purpose of the
search must be distinguishable from ordinary general crime control. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 41 (2000).
Foreign intelligence collection, especially in the midst of an armed conflict in which
the adversary has already launched catastrophic attacks within the United States, fits
squarely within the area of "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" where the Fourth Amendment's touchstone of reasonableness can be
satisfied without resort to a warrant. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653. The Executive Branch
has long maintained that collecting foreign intelligence is far removed from the
ordinary criminal law enforcement action to which the warrant requirement is
particularly suited. See, e.g., Amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:
Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong. 2d
Sess. 62, 63 (1994) (statement of Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick) ("[I]t is
important to understand that the rules and methodology for criminal searches are
inconsistent with the collection of foreign intelligence and would unduly frustrate the
President in carrying out his foreign intelligence responsibilities.... [W]e believe that
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to such [foreign
intelligence] searches."); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 745. The object of
foreign intelligence collection is securing information necessary to protect the national
security from the hostile designs of foreign powers like al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist
organizations, including the possibility of another foreign attack on the United States.
In foreign intelligence investigations, moreover, the targets of surveillance often are
agents of foreign powers, including international terrorist groups, who may be specially
trained in concealing their activities and whose activities may be particularly difficult
to detect. The Executive requires a greater degree of flexibility in this field to respond
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with speed and absolute secrecy to the ever-changing array of foreign threats faced by
the Nation.
22
In particular, the NSA activities are undertaken to prevent further devastating
attacks on our Nation, and they serve the highest government purpose through means
other than traditional law enforcement.23 The NSA activities are designed to enable the
Government to act quickly and flexibly (and with secrecy) to find agents of al Qaeda
and its affiliates-an international terrorist group which has already demonstrated a
capability to infiltrate American communities without being detected-in time to
disrupt future terrorist attacks against the United States. As explained by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, the nature of the "emergency" posed by al
Qaeda "takes the matter out of the realm of ordinary crime control." In re Sealed Case,
310 F.3d at 746. Thus, under the "special needs" doctrine, no warrant is required by
the Fourth Amendment for the NSA activities.
B. The NSA Activities Are Reasonable
As the Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly, "[tihe touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (quotation marks omitted); see
also Earls, 536 U.S. at 829. The Supreme Court has found a search reasonable when,
under the totality of the circumstances, the importance of the governmental interests
22. Even in the domestic context, the Supreme Court has recognized that there may be
significant distinctions between wiretapping for ordinary law enforcement purposes and
domestic national security surveillance. See United States v. United States District Court, 407
U.S. 297, 322 (1972) ("Keith") (explaining that "the focus of domestic [security] surveillance
may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime" because often
"the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency");
see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir. 1984) (reading Keith to recognize
that "the governmental interests presented in national security investigations differ substantially
from those presented in traditional criminal investigations"). Although the Court in Keith held
that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does apply to investigations of purely
domestic threats to national security-such as domestic terrorism, it suggested that Congress
consider establishing a lower standard for such warrants than that set forth in Title Il. See id. at
322-23 (advising that "different standards" from those applied to traditional law enforcement
"may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of the Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens"). Keith's emphasis on the need for flexibility applies with even greater force to
surveillance directed at foreign threats to national security. See S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 16 ("Far
more than in domestic security matters, foreign counterintelligence investigations are 'long
range' and involve 'the interrelation of various sources and types of information."') (quoting
Keith, 407 U.S. at 322). And flexibility is particularly essential here, where the purpose of the
NSA activities is to prevent another armed attack against the United States.
23. This is not to say that traditional law enforcement has no role in protecting the Nation
from attack. The NSA activities, however, are not directed at bringing criminals to justice but at
detecting and preventing plots by a declared enemy of the United States to attack it again.
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outweighs the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-22. Under the standard with the
Fourth Amendment.
With respect to the individual privacy interests at stake, there can be no doubt that,
as a general matter, interception of telephone communications implicates a significant
privacy interest of the individual whose conversation is intercepted. The Supreme
Court has made clear at least since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that
individuals have a substantial and constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy that their telephone conversations will not be subject to governmental
eavesdropping. Although the individual privacy interests at stake may be substantial, it
is well recognized that a variety of governmental interests-including routine law
enforcement and foreign-intelligence gathering-can overcome those interests.
On the other side of the scale here, the Government's interest in engaging in the
NSA activities is the most compelling interest possible-securing the Nation from
foreign attack in the midst of an armed conflict. One attack already has taken thousands
of lives and placed the Nation in state of armed conflict. Defending the Nation from
attack is perhaps the most important function of the federal Government-and one of
the few express obligations of the federal Government enshrined in the Constitution.
See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion .. ") (emphasis added); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,668 (1863)
("If war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized
but bound to resist force by force."). As the Supreme Court has declared, "[it is
'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation." Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
The Government's overwhelming interest in detecting and thwarting further al
Qaeda attacks is easily sufficient to make reasonable the intrusion into privacy
involved in intercepting one-end foreign communications where there is "a reasonable
basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda,
affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda."
Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1 .html (Dec. 19, 2005)
(statement of Attorney General Gonzales); cf Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (noting that "the
Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock
set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack" because "[t]he exigencies created by
th[at] scenario[] are far removed" from ordinary law enforcement). The United States
has already suffered one attack that killed thousands, disrupted the Nation's financial
center for days, and successfully struck at the command and control center for the
Nation's military. And the President has stated that the NSA activities are "critical" to
our national security. Press Conference of President Bush (Dec. 19, 2005). To this day,
finding al Qaeda sleeper agents in the United States remains one of the preeminent
concerns of the war on terrorism. As the President has explained, "[tihe terrorists want
to strike America again, and they hope to inflict even more damage than they did on
September 11 th." Id.
Of course, because the magnitude of the Government's interest here depends in part
upon the threat posed by al Qaeda, it might be possible for the weight that interest
carries in the balance to change over time. It is thus significant for the reasonableness
of the NSA activities that the President has established a system under which he
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authorizes the surveillance only for a limited period, typically for 45 days. This process
of reauthorization ensures a periodic review to evaluate whether the threat from al
Qaeda remains sufficiently strong that the Government's interest in protecting the
Nation and its citizens from foreign attack continues to outweigh the individual privacy
interests at stake.
Finally, as part of the balancing of interests to evaluate Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, it is significant that the NSA activities are limited to intercepting
international communications where there is a reasonable basis to conclude that one
party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization. This factor is relevant because the Supreme Court has indicated that in
evaluating reasonableness, one should consider the "efficacy of [the] means for
addressing the problem." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 834
("Finally, this Court must consider the nature and immediacy of the government's
concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them."). That consideration does not
mean that reasonableness requires the "least intrusive" or most "narrowly tailored"
means for obtaining information. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected such suggestions. See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 ("[Tjhis Court has
repeatedly stated that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require
employing the least intrusive means, because the logic of such elaborate less-
restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of
virtually all search-and-seizure powers.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Vernonia,
515 U.S. at 663 ("We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive'
search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). Nevertheless,
the Court has indicated that some consideration of the efficacy of the search being
implemented-that is, some measure of fit between the search and the desired
objective-is relevant to the reasonableness analysis. The NSA activities are targeted
to intercept international communications of persons reasonably believed to be
members or agents of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization, a limitation which
further strongly supports the reasonableness of the searches.
In sum, the NSA activities are consistent with the Fourth Amendment because the
warrant requirement does not apply in these circumstances, which involve both
"special needs" beyond the need for ordinary law enforcement and the inherent
authority of the President to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to obtain
foreign intelligence to protect our Nation from foreign armed attack. The touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the NSA activities are certainly
reasonable, particularly taking into account the nature of the threat the Nation faces.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the President-in light of the broad authority to use
military force in response to the attacks of September 11 th and to prevent further
catastrophic attack expressly conferred on the President by the Constitution and
confirmed and supplemented by Congress in the AUMF-has legal authority to
authorize the NSA to conduct the signals intelligence activities he has described. Those
activities are authorized by the Constitution and by statute, and they violate neither
FISA nor the Fourth Amendment.
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February 2,2006 Letter from Scholars and Former Government
Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice
Department Whitepaper of January 19,2006
Dear Members of Congress:
On January 9, 2006, we wrote you a letter setting forth our view that the Department
of Justice (DOJ)'s December 19, 2005 letter to the leaders of the Intelligence
Committees had failed to assert any plausible legal defense for the National Security
Agency's domestic spying program. On January 19, 2006, the DOJ submitted a more
extensive memorandum further explicating its defense of the program.' This letter
supplements our initial letter, and replies to the DOJ's January 19 memorandum. The
administration has continued to refuse to disclose the details of the program, and
therefore this letter, like our initial letter, is confined to responding to the DOJ's
arguments. The DOJ Memo, while much more detailed than its initial letter, continues
to advance the same flawed arguments, and only confirms that the NSA program lacks
any plausible legal justification.
In our initial letter, we concluded that the Authorization to Use Military Force
against al Qaeda (AUMF) could not reasonably be understood to authorize unlimited
warrantless electronic surveillance of persons within the United States, because
Congress had clearly denied precisely such authority in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), and had specifically addressed the question of electronic
surveillance during wartime. We also found unpersuasive the DOJ's contentions that
the AUMF and FISA should be construed to authorize such surveillance in order to
avoid constitutional concerns. FISA is not ambiguous on this subject, and therefore the
constitutional avoidance doctrine does not apply. And even if it did apply, the
constitutional avoidance doctrine would confirm FISA's plain meaning, because the
Fourth Amendment concerns raised by permitting warrantless domestic wiretapping
are far more serious than any purported concerns raised by subjecting domestic
wiretapping to the reasonable regulations established by FISA. The Supreme Court has
never upheld warrantless domestic wiretapping, and has never held that a President
acting as Commander in Chief can violate a criminal statute limiting his conduct.
As explained below, these conclusions are only confirmed by the more extended
explication provided in the DOJ Memo. To find the NSA domestic surveillance
program statutorily authorized on the ground advocated by the DOJ would require a
radical rewriting of clear and specific legislation to the contrary. And to find
warrantless wiretapping constitutionally permissible in the face of that contrary
legislation would require even more radical revisions of established separation-of-
powers doctrine.
1. U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National
Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19. 2006) (hereinafter "DOJ Memo").
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I. THE AUMF DOES NOT AUTHORIZE DOMESTIC ELEcTRONIc SURVEILLANCE
The DOJ Memo, like the DOJ's initial letter, continues to place primary reliance on
an argument that the AUMF silently authorized what Congress had in FISA clearly and
specifically forbidden-unlimited warrantless wiretapping during wartime. In our view,
the statutory language is dispositive on this question. The AUMF says nothing
whatsoever about wiretapping in the United States during wartime, while FISA
expressly addresses the subject, limiting authorization for warrantless surveillance to
the first fifteen days after war has been declared. 50 U.S.C. § 1811.2 Since Congress
specifically provided that even a declaration of war-a more formal step than an
authorization to use military force-would authorize only fifteen days of warrantless
surveillance, one cannot reasonably conclude that the AUMF provides the President
with unlimited and indefinite warrantless wiretapping authority.
Moreover, such a notion ignores any reasonable understanding of legislative intent.
An amendment to FISA of the sort that would presumably be required to authorize the
NSA program here would be a momentous statutory development, undoubtedly subject
to serious legislative debate. It is decidedly not the sort of thing that Congress would
enact inadvertently. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "'Congress... does not
alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes."' Gonzales v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457,468 (2001)).
The existence of 50 USC § 1811 also plainly distinguishes this situation from
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), on which the DOJ heavily relies. The DOJ
argues that since the Supreme Court in Hamdi construed the AUMF to provide
sufficient statutory authorization for detention of American citizens captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan, the AUMF may also be read to authorize the President to
conduct "signals intelligence" on the enemy, even if that includes electronic
surveillance targeting U.S. persons within the United States, the precise conduct
regulated by FISA. But in addition to the arguments made in our initial letter, a critical
difference in Hamdi is that Congress had not specifically regulated detention of
American citizens during wartime. Had there been a statute on the books providing that
when Congress declares war, the President may detain Americans as "enemy
combatants" only for the first fifteen days of the conflict, the Court could not
reasonably have read the AUMF to authorize silently what Congress had specifically
sought to limit. Yet that is what the DOJ's argument would require here.
3
2. Congress reaffirmed the approach set forth by 50 U.S.C. § 1811 for wartime authorities
in 1994 and 1998 when it added similar fifteen-day provisions for warrantless physical searches
and pen registers in the event of a declaration of war. Pub. L. No. 103-359, title VI, §
807(a)(3) (1994), codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1829 (physical searches); Pub. L. No. 105-272, title
VI, § 601(2) (1998), codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1844 (pen registers).
3. The DOJ argues that signals intelligence, like detention, is a "fundamental incident of
waging war," and therefore is authorized by the AUMF. DOJ Memo at 12-13. But what is
properly considered an implied incident of conducting war is affected by the statutory landscape
that exists at the time the war is authorized. Thus, even if warrantless electronic surveillance of
Americans for foreign intelligence purposes were a traditional incident of war when that subject
was unregulated by Congress-which is far from obvious, at least in cases where the Americans
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The DOJ Memo argues that 50 U.S.C. § 1811 is not dispositive because the AUMF
might convey more authority than a declaration of war, noting that a declaration of war
is generally only a single sentence. DOJ Memo at 26-27. But that distinction blinks
reality. Declarations of war have always been accompanied, in the same enactment, by
an authorization to use military force.4 It would make no sense, after all, to declare war
without authorizing the President to use military force in the conflict. In light of that
reality, § 1811 necessarily contemplates a situation in which Congress has both
declared war and authorized the use of military force-and even that double
authorization permits only fifteen days of warrantless electronic surveillance. Where,
as here, Congress has seen fit only to authorize the use of military force-and not to
declare war-the President cannot assert that he has been granted more authority than
when Congress declares war as well.
Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 confirms that Congress intended electronic surveillance to
be governed by FISA and the criminal code, and precludes the DOJ's argument that the
AUMF somehow silently overrode that specific intent. As we pointed out in our
opening letter, 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(f) specifies that FISA and the criminal code are the
"exclusive means" by which electronic surveillance is to be conducted. Moreover, 18
U.S.C. § 2511 makes it a crime to conduct wiretapping except as "specifically provided
in this chapter," § 2511(1), or as authorized by FISA, § 2511(2)(e). The AUMF is
neither "in this chapter" nor an amendment to FISA, and therefore 18 U.S.C. § 2511
provides compelling evidence that the AUMF should not be read to implicitly provide
authority for electronic surveillance.
The DOJ concedes in a footnote that its reading of the AUMF would require finding
this language from § 2511 to have been implicitly repealed. DOJ Memo at 36 n.21.
But as we noted in our initial letter, statutes may not be implicitly repealed absent
"overwhelming evidence" that Congress intended such a repeal. J.E.M. Ag. Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 137 (2001). Here, there is literally no
such evidence. Moreover, "'the only permissible justification for a repeal by
implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."' Id. at 141-142
targeted are not themselves suspected of being foreign agents or in league with terrorists-it can
no longer be an implied incident after the enactment of FISA, which expressly addresses the
situation of war, and which precludes such conduct beyond the first fifteen days of the conflict.
4. See Declaration against the United Kingdom, 2 Stat. 755 (June 18, 1812) (War of
1812); Recognition of war with Mexico, 9 Stat. 9-10 (May 13, 1846) (Mexican-American War);
Declaration against Spain, 30 Stat. 364 (Apr. 25, 1898) (Spanish-American War); Declaration
against Germany, 40 Stat. 1 (Apr. 6, 1917) (World War I); Declaration against the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, 40 Stat. 429 (Dec. 7, 1917) (same); Declaration against Japan, 55 Stat. 795
(Dec. 8, 1941) (World War H); Declaration against Germany, 55 Stat. 796 (Dec. 11, 1941)
(same); Declaration against Italy, 55 Stat. 797 (Dec. 11, 1941) (same); Declarations against
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, 56 Stat. 307 (June 5, 1942) (same).
5. It is noteworthy that one of the amendments the DOJ was contemplating seeking in
2002, in a draft bill leaked to the press and popularly known as "Patriot II," would have
amended 50 U.S.C. § 1811 to extend its fifteen-day authorization for warrantless wiretapping to
situations where Congress had not declared war but only authorized use of military force, or
where the nation had been attacked. If, as the DOJ now contends, the AUMF gave the President
unlimited authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping of the enemy, it would make no sense to
seek such an amendment. See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 103
(Strengthening Wartime Authorities Under FISA) (draft Justice Dept bill), available at
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf
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(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). Section 2511 and the
AUMF, however, are fully reconcilable. The former makes clear that specified
existing laws are the "exclusive means" for conducting electronic surveillance, and that
conducting wiretapping outside that specified legal regime is a crime. The AUMF
authorizes only such force as is "necessary and appropriate." There is no evidence that
Congress considered tactics violative of express statutory limitations "appropriate
force." Accordingly, there is no basis whatsoever for overcoming the strong
presumption against implied repeals.
The DOJ is correct, of course, that Congress contemplated that it might authorize
the President to engage in wiretapping during wartime that would not otherwise be
permissible. But Congress created a clear statutory mechanism for addressing that
possibility-a fifteen-day window in which warrantless wiretapping was permissible-
for the precise purpose that the President could seek amendments to FISA to go further
if he deemed it necessary to do so. The President in this case sidestepped that statutory
process, but in doing so appears to have contravened two clear and explicit criminal
provisions-18 U.S.C. § 2511 and 50 U.S.C. § 1809.
In short, the DOJ Memo fails to offer any plausible argument that Congress
authorized the President to engage in warrantless domestic electronic surveillance
when it enacted the AUMF. The DOJ' s reading would require interpreting a statute that
is entirely silent on the subject to have implicitly repealed and wholly overridden the
carefully constructed and criminally enforced "exclusive means" created by Congress
for the regulation of electronic surveillance.
II. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMANDER IN CHIEF ROLE DoES NOT AuTHoRIZE HIM TO
OVERRIDE EXPRESS CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
In its initial letter to Congress defending the NSA spying program, the DOJ
suggested that its reading of the AUMF should be adopted to avoid a possible "conflict
between FISA and the President's Article II authority as Commander-in-Chief." DOJ
Letter at 4. The DOJ Memorandum goes further, arguing that the President has
exclusive constitutional authority over "the means and methods of engaging the
enemy," and that therefore if FISA prohibits warrantless "electronic surveillance"
deemed necessary by the President, FISA is unconstitutional. DOJ Memo at 6-10,28-
36.
The argument that conduct undertaken by the Commander in Chief that has some
relevance to "engaging the enemy" is immune from congressional regulation finds no
support in, and is directly contradicted by, both case law and historical precedent.
Every time the Supreme Court has confronted a statute limiting the Commander-in-
Chief s authority, it has upheld the statute. No precedent holds that the President, when
acting as Commander in Chief, is free to disregard an Act of Congress, much less a
criminal statute enacted by Congress, that was designed specifically to restrain the
President as such.
The DOJ Memo spends substantial energy demonstrating the unremarkable fact that
Presidents in discharging the role of Commander in Chief have routinely collected
signals intelligence on the enemy during wartime. As we noted in our initial letter, that
conclusion is accurate but largely irrelevant, because for most of our history Congress
did not regulate foreign intelligence gathering in any way. As Justice Jackson made
clear in his influential opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
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579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), to say that a President may undertake
certain conduct in the absence of contrary congressional action does not mean that he
may undertake that action where Congress has addressed the issue and disapproved of
executive action. Here, Congress has not only disapproved of the action the President
has taken, but made it a crime.
The Supreme Court has addressed the propriety of executive action contrary to
congressional statute during wartime on only a handful of occasions, and each time it
has required the President to adhere to legislative limits on his authority. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, as we explained in our initial letter, the Court invalidated
the President's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, where Congress had
"rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in
cases of emergency." 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952); see also id. at 597-609 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); id. at 656-660 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 662-666 (Clark, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
In Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), the Court held unlawful a
seizure pursuant to Presidential order of a ship during the "Quasi War" with France.
The Court found that Congress had authorized the seizure only of ships going to
France, and therefore the President could not unilaterally order the seizure of a ship
coming from France. Just as in Youngstown, the Court invalidated executive action
taken during wartime, said to be necessary to the war effort, but implicitly disapproved
by Congress.
If anything, President Bush's unilateral executive action is more sharply in conflict
with congressional legislation than in either Youngstown or Barreme. In those cases,
Congress had merely failed to give the President the authority in question, and thus the
statutory limitation was implicit. Here, Congress went further, and expressly prohibited
the President from taking the action he has taken. And it did so in the strongest way
possible, by making the conduct a crime.
The Supreme Court recently rejected a similar assertion of wartime authority in
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), not even discussed in the DOJ's Memo. In that
case, the Bush administration argued, just as it does now, that it would be
unconstitutional to interpret a statute to infringe upon the President's powers as
Commander in Chief. It argued that construing the habeas corpus statute to encompass
actions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees "would directly interfere with the
Executive's conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters," and
would raise "grave constitutional problems." Brief for Respondents at 42, 44, Rasul v.
Bush (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). Refusing to accept this argument, the Court held that
Congress had conferred habeas jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain the
detainees' habeas actions. Even Justice Scalia, who dissented, agreed that Congress
could have extended habeas jurisdiction to the Guantanamo detainees. Rasul, 542 U.S.
at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, not a single Justice accepted the Bush
administration's contention that the President's role as Commander in Chief could not
be limited by congressional and judicial oversight.6
6. Similarly, in Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Court unanimously held
that the Executive violated the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 696, by failing to
discharge from military custody a petitioner held by order of the President and charged with,
inter alia, affording aid and comfort to rebels, inciting insurrection, and violation of the laws of
war. See id. at 115-117, 131 (majority opinion); id. at 133-136 (Chase, C.J., concurring); see
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If it were unconstitutional for Congress in any fashion to restrict the "means and
methods of engaging the enemy," Rasul should have come out the other way. Surely
detaining enemy foreign nationals captured on the battlefield is far closer to the core of
"engaging the enemy" than is warrantless wiretapping of U.S. persons within the
United States. Yet the Court squarely held that the habeas corpus statute did apply to
the detentions, and that the detainees had unquestionably stated a claim for relief based
on their allegations. 542 U.S. at 484 n. 15. Thus, Rasul refutes the DOJ's contention
that Congress may not enact statutes that regulate and limit the President's options as
Commander in Chief.
And in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court exercised the power to review the President's
detention of a U.S. citizen enemy combatant, and expressly rejected the President's
argument that courts may not inquire into the factual basis for such a detention. As
Justice O'Connor wrote for the plurality, "[wihatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake." 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
In fact, as cases such as Hamdi and Rasul demonstrate, Congress has routinely
enacted statutes regulating the Commander-in-Chief's "means and methods of
engaging the enemy." It has subjected the Armed Forces to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which expressly restricts the means they use in "engaging the enemy."
It has enacted statutes setting forth the rules for governing occupied territory. See
Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265-266 (1909). And most recently, it has
enacted statutes prohibiting torture under all circumstances, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
and prohibiting the use of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Pub. L. No. 109-
148, Div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739-2740 (2005). These limitations make ample
sense in light of the overall constitutional structure. Congress has the explicit power
"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 14. The President has the explicit constitutional obligation to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S. Const., art. II, § 3-including
FISA. And Congress has the explicit power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution... all ... Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
Const., art. I, § 18.
If the DOJ were correct that Congress cannot interfere with the Commander in
Chief's discretion in "engaging the enemy," all of these statutes would be
unconstitutional. Yet the President recently conceded that Congress may
constitutionally bar him from engaging in torture. Torturing a suspect, no less than
wiretapping an American, might provide information about the enemy that could
conceivably help prevent a future attack, yet the President has now conceded that
Congress can prohibit that conduct. Congress has as much authority to regulate
also id.at 133 (noting that "[t]he constitutionality of this act has not been questioned and is not
doubted," even though the act "limited this authority [of the President to suspend habeas] in
important respects").
7. In an interview on CBS News, President Bush said "I don't think a president can order
torture, for example.... There are clear red lines." Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and
His Senior Aides Press On in Legal Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28,
2006, at A13.
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wiretapping of Americans as it has to regulate torture of foreign detainees.
8
Accordingly, the President cannot simply contravene Congress's clear criminal
prohibitions on electronic surveillance.
The DOJ argues in the alternative that even if Congress may regulate "signals
intelligence" during wartime to some degree, construing FISA to preclude warrantless
wiretapping of Americans impermissibly intrudes on the President's exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief role. DOJ Memo at 29, 34-35. This argument is also
unsupported by precedent and wholly unpersuasive.
In considering the extent of the "intrusion" FISA imposes on the President, it is
important first to note what FISA does and does not regulate. Administration
defenders have repeatedly argued that if the President is wiretapping an al Qaeda
member in Afghanistan, it should not have to turn off the wiretap simply because he
happens to call someone within the United States. The simple answer is that nothing in
FISA would compel that result. FISA does not regulate electronic surveillance acquired
abroad and targeted at non-U.S. persons, even if the surveillance happens to collect
information on a communication with a U.S. person. Thus, the hypothetical tap on the
al Qaeda member abroad is not governed by FISA at all. FISA's requirements are
triggered only when the surveillance is "targeting [a] United States person who is in the
United States," or the surveillance "acquisition occurs in the United States." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(f)(l)-(2).
Second, even when the target of surveillance is a U.S. person, or the information is
acquired here, FISA does not require that the wiretap be turned off, but merely that it
be approved by a judge, based on a showing of probable cause that the target is a
member of a terrorist organization or a "lone wolf' terrorist. See id. § § 1801 (a)-(b),
1805(a)-(b). Such judicial approval may be obtained after the wiretap is put in place,
so long as it is approved within 72 hours. Id. § 1805(f). Accordingly, the notion that
FISA bars wiretapping of suspected al Qaeda members is a myth.
Because FISA leaves unregulated electronic surveillance conducted outside the
United States and not targeted at U.S. persons, it leaves to the President's unfettered
discretion a wide swath of "signals intelligence." Moreover, it does not actually
prohibit any signals intelligence regarding al Qaeda, but merely requires judicial
approval where the surveillance targets a U.S. person or is acquired here. As such, the
statute cannot reasonably be said to intrude impermissibly upon the President's ability
to "engage the enemy," and certainly does not come anywhere close to "prohibit[ing]
the President from undertaking actions necessary to fulfill his constitutional obligation
to protect the Nation from foreign attack." DOJ Memo at 35. Again, if, as President
Bush concedes, Congress can absolutely prohibit certain methods of "engaging the
enemy," such as torture, surely it can impose reasonable regulations on electronic
surveillance of U.S. persons.
8. The DOJ Memo oddly suggests that Congress's authority to enact FISA is less "clear"
than was the power of Congress to act in Youngstown and Little v. Barreme, both of which
involved congressional action at what the DOJ calls the "core" of Congress's enumerated
Article I powers-regulating commerce. DOJ Memo at 33. But FISA was also enacted pursuant
to "core" Article I powers-including the same foreign commerce power at issue in Little, and,
as applied to the NSA, Congress's powers under the Rules for Government and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.
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As in its earlier letter, the DOJ Memo invokes the decision of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 742
(FIS Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). The court in that case suggested in dictum that
Congress cannot "encroach on the President's constitutional power" to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance. But this statement cannot bear the weight the DOJ would
assign to it. First, the court in that case upheld FISA's constitutionality, so its holding
precludes the conclusion that any regulation of foreign intelligence gathering amounts
to impermissible "encroachment." (The court did not even attempt to define what sorts
of regulations would constitute impermissible "encroachment.") Second, as noted in
our initial letter, the court cited only a decision holding that before FISA was enacted,
the President had inherent authority to engage in certain foreign intelligence
surveillance, and that acknowledged the propriety of FISA (see United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980)). As explained above, the
President's authority after FISA is enacted is very different from his authority in the
absence of any statutory guidance.
III. WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING RAISES SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
As we noted in our initial letter, the NSA spying program not only violates a
specific criminal prohibition and the separation of powers, but also raises serious
constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment. In dealing with this issue, we
address only the arguments advanced by the DOJ regarding the current initiative of the
President, and express no opinion on whether any future legislation that Congress
might pass on the issues now covered by FISA would satisfy the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Most relevant to the present situation, however, is the simple fact
that the Supreme Court has never upheld warrantless wiretapping within the United
States, for any purpose. The Court has squarely held that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in telephone calls, and that probable cause and a warrant are
necessary to authorize electronic surveillance of such communications. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). And it has specifically rejected the argument that
domestic security concerns justify warrantless wiretapping. United States v. United
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Although the Court in United States Dist. Court did not address whether warrantless
wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes would be permissible, the only rationale
put forward by the DOJ for squaring such conduct with the Fourth Amendment is
unpersuasive. The DOJ contends that the NSA program can be justified under a line of
Fourth Amendment cases permitting searches without warrants and probable cause in
order to further "special needs" above and beyond ordinary law enforcement. DOJ
Memo at 36-41. But while it is difficult to apply the Fourth Amendment without
knowing the details of the program, the "special needs" doctrine, which has sustained
automobile drunk driving checkpoints and standardized drug testing in schools, does
not appear to support warrantless wiretapping of this kind.
While the need to gather intelligence on the enemy surely qualifies as a "special
need," that is only the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. The Court then looks to a
variety of factors to assess whether the search is reasonable, including the extent of the
intrusion, whether the program is standardized or allows for discretionary targeting,
and whether there is a demonstrated need to dispense with the warrant and probable
cause requirements. The Court has upheld highway drunk driving checkpoints, for
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example, because they are standardized, the stops are brief and minimally intrusive,
and a warrant and probable cause requirement would defeat the purpose of keeping
drunk drivers off the road. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
Similarly, it has upheld school drug testing programs because students have diminished
expectations of privacy in school, the programs are limited to students engaging in
extracurricular programs (so students have advance notice and the choice to opt out),
and the drug testing is standardized and tests only for the presence of drugs. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
The NSA spying program has none of the safeguards found critical to upholding
"special needs" searches in other contexts. It consists not of a minimally intrusive brief
stop on a highway or urine test, but of the wiretapping of private telephone and email
communications. It is not standardized, but subject to discretionary targeting under a
standard and process that remain secret. Those whose privacy is intruded upon have no
notice or choice to opt out of the surveillance. And it is neither limited to the
environment of a school nor analogous to a brief stop for a few seconds at a highway
checkpoint. Finally, and most importantly, the fact that FISA has been used
successfully for almost thirty years demonstrates that a warrant and probable cause
regime is not impracticable for foreign intelligence surveillance.
Accordingly, to extend the "special needs" doctrine to the NSA program, which
authorizes unlimited warrantless wiretapping of the most private of conversations
without statutory authority, judicial review, or probable cause, would be to render that
doctrine unrecognizable. The DOJ's efforts to fit the square peg of NSA surveillance
into the round hole of the "special needs" doctrine only underscores the grave
constitutional concerns that this program raises.
In sum, we remain as unpersuaded by the DOJ's 42-page attempt to find authority
for the NSA spying program as we were of its initial five-page version. The DOJ's
more extended discussion only reaffirms our initial conclusion, because it makes clear
that to find this program statutorily authorized would require rewriting not only clear
and specific federal legislation, but major aspects of constitutional doctrine.
Accordingly, we continue to believe that the administration has failed to offer any
plausible legal justification for the NSA program.
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